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Theses
•	 The	war	with	Russia	which	began	in	2014	has	triggered	serious	
changes	 in	 the	way	history	 is	 thought	 about	by	 the	Ukrain-
ian	public,	 especially	 in	 opinion-forming	 circles.	The	 liberal	
reflection	 critical	 about	 the	 nationalist	 tradition	 initiated	
somewhat	 earlier	 has	 been	 rejected	 since	wartime	 requires	
heroic	narratives	above	all.	Ukraine	also	had	to	counteract	the	
propaganda	offensive	from	Russia	which	wanted	to	equate	the	
Ukrainian	patriotic	movement	with	radical	nationalism	seen	
at	the	time	of	World	War	II,	which	it	branded	as	‘fascist’.	
•	 The	present	Ukrainian	leaders	do	not	view	identity	policy	as	
an	 important	element	of	 the	 functioning	of	 the	state	or	 that	
it	is	their	primary	task.	Therefore	they	entrusted	this	task	to	
the	Ukrainian	Institute	of	National	Remembrance	(UINP),	an	
institution	with	small	organisational	potential.	However,	 its	
head,	Volodymyr	Viatrovych,	has	managed	to	turn	it	into	an	
influential	centre	in	a	very	short	time,	aiming	not	so	much	at	
studying	 and	 commemorating	 history	 but	 rather	 at	 actively	
forming	the	historical	memory	of	Ukraine’s	citizens.	His	ac-
tivity,	tacitly	supported	by	the	government,	has	caused	a	radi-
cal	change	in	Ukraine’s	remembrance	policy.	
•	 As	a	result	of	the	war,	the	Ukrainian	public,	even	its	Russian-
speaking	section,	turned	their	backs	on	Russia	and	its	tradi-
tions.	The	fact	that	the	official	historical	narrative	of	the	Rus-
sian	 Federation	 increasingly	 refers	 to	 Soviet	 times	makes	 it	
easier	for	Ukrainians	to	also	reject	the	Soviet	tradition,	which	
is	combined	with	their	acceptance	of	decommunisation.	
•	 Ukraine	 has	 seen	 a	 radical	 decommunisation	 of	 the	 public	
space	since	the	Revolution	of	Dignity;	almost	all	monuments	
bearing	Soviet	content	(except	for	war	monuments)	have	been	
removed	and	almost	all	the	names	of	cities,	towns	and	villages	
and	a	significant	part	of	the	names	of	streets	and	institutions	
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referring	to	the	Communist	regime	have	been	changed.	This	
process	is	still	not	over	but	has	not	been	resisted	by	the	public	
or	regional	elites.	
•	 In	2015,	Ukraine	discontinued	its	use	of	the	concept	and	the	term	
“Great	Patriotic	War”	(implicitly:	of	the	Soviet	Union)	replacing	
it	with	the	term	“World	War	II”, which	in	the	case	of	Ukrainians	
also	 lasted	between	 1939	and	 1945.	This	 involved	emphasising	
the	huge	losses	sustained	by	Ukraine	and	its	contribution	to	the	
victory	over	Germany	as	well	as	a	far-reaching	reinterpretation	
of	history	aimed	at	causing	the	UPA	to	be	recognised	as	one	of	
the	forces	which	co-formed	the	anti-Nazi	coalition.
•	 The	actions	which	the	Ukrainian	Institute	of	National	Remem-
brance	(UINP)	and	centres	linked	to	it	(for	example,	the	influ-
ential	portal	 Istorychna	Pravda)	have	taken	since	2014	have	
ultimately	led	to	the	UPA	being	made	part	of	the	positive	tra-
dition	 of	 national	 history.	 However,	 any	 critical	 reflection	
concerning	 this	organisation	has	been	hampered,	given	 the	
wartime	propa	ganda	needs	of	and	due	to	the	fact	 that	criti-
cism	 of	 not	 only	 the	 UPA	 but	 also	 the	 Ukrainian	 national	
movement	as	a	whole	has	been	an	element	of	Moscow’s	anti-
Ukrainian	propa	ganda.	The	official	narrative	concerning	the	
UPA	and	other	nationalist	formations	existing	at	the	time	of	
World	War	 II	 hushes	 up	 or	 downplays	 in	 various	ways	 the	
crimes	they	committed.	
•	 The	participation	of	Ukrainians	 in	 formations	which	collab-
orated	with	the	Nazis	and	contributed	to	the	Holocaust	is	no	
longer	a	taboo	in	Ukraine.	Nevertheless,	this	is	still	a	difficult	
topic,	which	is	often	avoided	and	sometimes	the	Holocaust	it-
self	 is	downplayed,	 thus	becoming	an	 increasing	problem	in	
Ukraine’s	relations	with	the	West.	
•	 If	 the	propaganda	work	of	 the	UINP	 is	continued	for	a	suffi-
cient	period,	and	the	institute’s	influence	on	school	education	
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is	preserved,	 the	decommunisation	of	 the	national	 tradition	
will	 achieve	 its	 intended	 goal.	 However,	 building	 a	 positive	
memory	of	the	UPA	will	be	successful	above	all	in	the	western	
and	central	parts	of	the	country,	while	acceptance	of	the	posi-
tive	image	of	this	organisation	will	also	grow	in	eastern	and	
southern	Ukraine.	What	will	contribute	to	this	is	the	fact	that	
a	 significant	 section	 of	 the	 Ukrainian	 public	 demonstrates	
a	neutral	attitude	towards	decommunisation	regardless	of	the	
degree	to	which	they	accept	it.	
•	 A	five-year	cycle	of	commemorating	one	hundred	years	of	the	
Ukrainian	struggle	 for	 independence	 focused	on	 the	history	
of	 the	Ukrainian	People’s	Republic	 (a	social	democratic	state	
set	up	in	1917)	was	launched	in	March	2017.	These	celebrations	
will	 certainly	 popularise	 this	 section	 of	 Ukraine’s	 history,	
knowledge	of	which	is	currently	very	poor	among	the	Ukrain-
ian	public.	This	may	also	lead	to	the	emergence	of	a	new	na-
tional	patriotic	narrative.	
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InTroducTIon
A	 few	months	before	 the	Revolution	of	Dignity,	OSW	published	
a	Point of View entitled	 ‘The	Place	of	 the	UPA	 in	 the	Great	Patri-
otic	War.	The	dilemmas	of	Ukraine’s	historical	policy’	written	by	
the	author	of	this	paper1.	Some	of	its	theses	were	soon	rendered	
obsolete	as	a	result	of	the	developments	which	took	place	in	the	
meantime:	the	category	of	the	Great	Patriotic	War	has	been	elimi-
nated	 from	 Ukrainian	 political	 and	 historical	 reflection,	 while	
the	narrative	of	the	‘Little	Russia	as	an	equal	member	of	the	Rus-
sian	Empire’	was	discontinued	as	a	result	of	the	war.	No	room	has	
been	left	in	Ukraine	for	any	narratives	of	the	historical	union	of	
Ukrainians	and	Russians.	
In	this	text	we	will	not	repeat	the	descriptions	of	the	preliminar-
ies	of	the	Ukrainian	historical	policy	and	the	way	it	was	changing	
until	2013.	Instead,	we	will	focus	on	the	changes	that	have	been	
seen	in	this	area	due	to	the	Revolution	of	Dignity,	the	new	role	of	
the	Ukrainian	 Institute	of	National	Remembrance,	 and	 the	war	
with	Russia2.	
This	paper	discusses	historical	policy	in	the	strictest	sense,	skip-
ping	any	other	elements	of	the	Ukrainian	identity	policy,	such	as	
the	memory	of	 those	killed	during	 the	Maidan	 (Heavenly	Hun-
dred)	and	during	 the	war	 (Heavenly	Guard)	manifested,	 for	ex-
ample,	through	the	erection	of	numerous	monuments.	Nor	does	it	
raise	the	issue	of	the	still	existing,	albeit	less	intense	than	under	
Viktor	 Yanukovych’s	 rule,	 dispute	 over	 the	 country’s	 linguistic	
1	 Tadeusz	A.	Olszański,	Miejsce	UPA	w	Wielkiej	Wojnie	Ojczyźnianej.	Dyle-
maty	polityki	historycznej	Ukrainy,	OSW Point of View,	21	June	2013,	https://
www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/punkt-widzenia/2013–06–21/miejsce-upa-
w-wielkiej-wojnie-ojczyznianej-dylematy-polityki	
2	 Regardless	of	the	fact	that	Kyiv	formally	declares	that	it	is	engaged	only	in	an	
anti-terrorist	operation	(ATO),	there	is	no	doubt	whatsoever	that	a	regular,	
if	undeclared,	war	is	being	fought	in	eastern	Ukraine,	currently	with	a	low	
intensity	of	military	activity.	This	is	also	how	the	situation	is	seen	by	Ukrain-
ian	citizens.	
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policy,	top-down	attempts	to	Ukrainise	the	media,	or	disputes	as	
to	whether	the	Donbas	is	part	of	Ukraine	in	civilisational	terms	
and	other	similar	issues.	
This	text	consists	of	three	parts.	The	first	one	discusses	the	decom-
munisation	of	 the	public	 space	 that	 took	place	 in	2014–2016	and	
its	 significance.	The	 second	one	presents	 the	 change	of	 attitude	
towards	World	War	II,	including	the	problem	posed	by	the	Holo-
caust	and	the	attitude	towards	the	UPA	and	Stepan	Bandera	in	the	
Ukrainian	 remembrance	policy.	The	 third	part	discusses	 a	new	
element	which	 is	 the	most	 surprising	and	signifies	 the	greatest	
changes	 in	 the	 Ukrainian	 collective	 consciousness:	 the	 process	
of	 returning	 the	 Ukrainian	 People’s	 Republic	 and	 the	 strug-
gle	 for	 independence	 in	 1917–1921	to	 the	 positive	 national	 tradi-
tion;	this	was	initiated	in	March	this	year	and	it	will	be	possible	
to	evaluate	the	success	of	this	project	in	a	few	years	at	the	earliest.	
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I. The warTIme TransformaTIon 
of hIsTorIcal conscIousness
The	Revolution	of	Dignity	has	brought	only	one	major	change	in	
the	Ukrainian	remembrance	policy:	the	Leninfall	(the	spontane-
ous	destruction	of	monuments	to	Lenin	in	February	and	March	
2014)	the	scale	of	which	meant	that	the	government	not	only	did	
not	 dare	 counteract	 the	 toppling	 of	 the	 statues	 of	 Communist	
leaders	but	also	had	to	join	in	this	process	(with	a	few	exceptions	
on	the	local	level).	Before	further	consequences	of	the	revolution	
became	visible,	the	war	came	and	seriously	changed	the	way	the	
state	and	society	function,	including	as	regards	experiencing	and	
forming	 identity	 (and	 thus	 also	 historical	 policy).	 War	 was	 no	
longer	a	story	of	the	past	or	of	other	distant	countries:	it	affected	
their	own	land,	their	compatriots	and	often	people	close	to	them.	
And	 the	opponent	 in	 this	war	was	Russia,	 a	 country	viewed	by	
a	very	large	number	of	Ukrainians3	as	still	not	‘fully’	foreign4	and	
whose	language	for	many	of	them	was	the	main	tool	of	participa-
tion	in	public	life.	
The	war	provoked	a	sudden	escape	from	the	 ‘Russianness’	man-
ifested	 in	both	state	policy	 (official	 restrictions	on	 the	presence	
of	both	 the	Russian	 language	and	 cultural	products	 originating	
from	the	Russian	Federation,	above	all	songs,	in	the	mass	media,	
eliminating	 Russian	 TV	 channels	 from	 cable	 networks,	 block-
ing	Russian	social	networking	media	and	an	Internet	browser	in	
spring	2017),	the	activity	of	intellectual	and	culture-forming	cir-
cles	(a	return	to	the	slogan	‘Away	from	Moscow’5,	questioning	any	
3	 The	term	‘Ukrainians’	(outside	historical	contexts)	used	in	this	text	in	all	
cases	means	citizens	of	Ukraine,	regardless	of	their	declared	and/or	experi-
enced	ethnic	identity.	In	those	cases	where	members	of	the	Ukrainian	ethnic	
and	national	community	are	mentioned,	the	term	‘ethnic	Ukrainians’	is	used.	
4	 Ukrainian	citizens	can	still	enter	the	territory	of	the	Russian	Federation	on	
the	basis	of	identity	cards.	
5	 ‘Het’	vid	Moskvy’	in	Ukrainian.	This	slogan	was	coined	in	the	1920s	by	Myko-
la	Khvylovy,	a	Ukrainian	poet	and	Bolshevik	cultural	activist.	
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positive	links	between	Ukraine	and	Russia	and	between	Russians	
and	Ukrainians	existing	in	the	past),	and	the	actions	of	ordinary	
people	who	often	 stop	using	 the	Russian	 language	despite	 their	
highly	 insufficient	command	of	Ukrainian,	and	make	 the	effort	
to	 improve	 their	 knowledge	 of	Ukrainian.	The	war	 seems	 to	 be	
far	from	over	today,	so	it	 is	difficult	to	predict	what	its	ultimate	
impact	will	be	on	public	life.	However,	the	latter	of	the	elements	
described	 above	 seems	 to	 be	 irreversible:	 residents	 of	 Ukraine	
consciously	want	to	speak	Ukrainian	to	an	increasing	extent.	This	
obviously	does	not	mean	that	Russian-speaking	circles	or	nation-
al	minorities	will	disappear,	but	they	will	no	longer	predominate.	
The	ongoing	transformation	of	the	Ukrainian	historical	conscious-
ness	is	also	affected	by	other	factors	which	can	only	be	mentioned	
briefly	in	this	text.	The	war	has	strengthened	the	feeling,	which	
had	arisen	earlier,	 that	Ukraine	 is	 isolated	on	 the	 international	
arena	and	can	only	count	on	 itself	 (this	view	 is	manifested	and	
also	strengthened	by	the	rhetoric	describing	the	present	war	as	
the	beginning	of	World	War	III	where	Ukraine	alone	is	contain-
ing	the	Russian	aggression	directed	against	Europe	as	a	whole6).	
There	is	also	a	growing	conviction	that,	given	the	present	situa-
tion,	 both	 international	 and	 domestic,	 Ukraine	 has	 no	 chance	
whatsoever	of	joining	NATO	or	the	European	Union7.	Sometimes	
the	 opinion	 can	 be	 heard	 that	 the	 ‘Polish	 Round	 Table	 talks	 in	
6	 Cf.	the	statement	of	the	Ukrainian	parliamentary	speaker,	Andriy	Parubiy,	
of	May	2016,	“Our	boys	who	defend	Ukraine’s	independence	in	the	Donbas	
today	are	not	fighting	for	Ukraine	alone,	but	they	are	defending	Europe	as	
a	whole,	 the	entire	civilised	world”;	http://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/
parubiy/5739f7e2e7ec4/	accessed	on	17 May 2016.	A	milder	version	of	this	
view	was	formed	in	February	2017	by	the	liberal	Ukrainian	journalist	Vitaly	
Portnikov,	“Warsaw	should	understand	that	it	is	not	Washington,	not	NATO	
and	not	Euro-Atlantic	solidarity	but	Ukraine	that	protects	Poland’s	security	
and	future”	quoted	from:	http://kresy24.pl.warszawa-powinna-zrozumiec-
nie-nato-i-waszyngton-lecz-ukraina-broni-bezpieczenstwa-i-przyszlosci-
polski/,	accessed	on	8	February	2017.
7	 Cf.	for	example,	the	statement	made	by	Mykola	Riabchuk	in	November	2016,	
www.raamoprusland.nl/dossiers/oekraine/311-ukraine-s-turbulent-past-
between-hagiography-and-demonization,	accessed	on	16	November	2016.	
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1989	would	have	been	impossible	if	not	for	the	UPA’s	struggle	with	
the	NKVD	in	1944–1953’8,	which	 is	difficult	 to	describe	 in	 terms	
other	than	a	manifestation	of	megalomania.	
The	 disturbance	 of	 the	 global	 order	 (the	 civil	war	 in	 Syria,	 the	
emergence	of	Islamic	State,	the	refugee	crisis	in	Western	Europe,	
and	Brexit	and	the	disputes	over	the	future	shape	of	the	European	
Union	 associated	with	 it)	 is	 perfectly	 seen	 from	Kyiv’s	 perspec-
tive,	triggering	the	growing	widespread	response	to	it	in	the	form	
of	 a	 search	 for	 stronger	 identities	 (national	 and	 other)	 and	 the	
revival	of	radical	right-	and	left-wing	movements.	Ukraine	is	in-
creasingly	participating	in	the	global	circulation	of	ideas.	There-
fore,	the	state	policy	must	take	this	into	account.	
What	has	had	a	great	impact	on	the	formation	of	Ukrainian	his-
torical	policy	was	the	fact	that	the	Ukrainian	Institute	of	National	
Remembrance	(UINP)	was	granted	the	status	of	a	central	state	ad-
ministration	agency9	and	that	Volodymyr	Viatrovych	was	put	in	
charge	of	 it10.	Viatrovych	proved	 to	be	a	brilliant	organiser	and	
quickly	changed	UINP,	an	 institution	which	had	been	suffering	
8	 Oleksandr	Zinchenko,	‘Zamist'	pislamovy’	[in]	Vijya dvokh pravd. Polaky ta 
ukrayintsi u kryvavomu XX stolitti,	Kharkiv	2017,	p.	296.	Similar	opinions	have	
also	been	expressed	by	other	authors.	
9	 UINP	was	established	by	President	Yushchenko	in	2006	as	a	‘special	status	
agency	of	the	central	executive	power’.	However,	its	heads	at	that	time	were	
inept	and	incompetent,	and	the	institute	did	not	play	any	major	role	then.	
In	2010	it	was	transformed	into	a	governmental	research	and	development	
centre	and	lost	any	significance	(to	the	best	of	our	knowledge,	it	was	not	en-
gaged	in	any	research	activity).	At	present,	the	director	of	UINP	is	nominated	
by	the	government	upon	a	motion	by	the	prime	minister,	but	his	dependence	
on	the	government	is	only	formal.	
10	 Volodymyr	Viatrovych	was	born	in	1977	in	Lviv.	He	is	a	historian	(PhD	the-
sis	in	2004),	publicist	and	social	activist	and,	being	the	director	of	UINP,	
also	a	politician.	He	took	part	in	the	Orange	Revolution	in	2004	and	in	the	
Revolution	of	Dignity.	In	2002–2008,	he	served	as	the	director	of	the	Centre	
for	Research	of	Liberation	Movement	which	he	created	(at	present,	he	is	the	
head	of	its	academic	council),	in	2007–2008	he	was	an	employee	of	UINP,	
in	2008–2010	he	held	the	position	of	director	of	the	Archive	of	the	Secu-
rity	Service	of	Ukraine,	in	2010–2011	he	was	on	an	internship	at	Harvard	
University.	Viatrovych	has	served	as	director	of	UINP	since	March	2014.	
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from	staff	and	financial	shortages11,	 into	the	main	centre	of	his-
torical	policy	and	even	identity	policy	of	Ukraine.	Viatrovych	and	
his	associates	skilfully	use	the	opportunities	offered	by	the	mod-
ern	media,	including	social	networking	and	advertisement	tools,	
and	 are	 engaged	 in	 large-scale	 propaganda	 and	 educational	 ac-
tivity.	One	of	UINP’s	major	allies	is	the	portal	Istorychna	Pravda,	
a	section	of	Ukrayinska	Pravda,	one	of	Ukraine’s	most	important	
internet	socio-political	portals.	
The	head	of	UINP	skilfully	capitalised	on	the	fact	that,	even	though	
the	 leading	Ukrainian	politicians	were	aware	of	 the	need	 for	 the	
state	to	adopt	a	historical	policy,	they	completely	failed	to	under-
stand	what	it	should	be	like,	nor	was	it	a	priority	for	them.	So	Prime	
Minister	 Yatsenyuk	 entrusted	 this	 task	 to	 Viatrovych,	 who	 had	
earned	great	respect	as	one	of	Maidan	activists	but	had	neither	the	
political	experience	nor	the	ambition	to	embark	upon	a	formal	po-
litical	career	and	thus	did	not	pose	a	threat	to	any	faction	or	coterie.	
This	way	the	head	of	UINP	effortlessly	gained	the	position	of	 the	
main	architect	of	Ukraine’s	historical	policy;	and	this	position	has	
not	been	challenged	by	Yatsenyuk’s	dismissal	and	the	 increasing	
influence	of	President	Poroshenko	on	the	government12.	
Viatrovych	is	consistently	implementing	his	agenda,	above	all	its	
anti-Communist,	 state-building	and	anti-Russian	elements,	 and	
In	his	research	he	has	focused	on	the	activity	of	the	UPA;	his	attitude	to	this	
organisation	can	be	described	as	apologetic.	
11	 UINP’s	budget	in	2015	was	5.7	million	hryvnias,	and	in	2016	it	was	increased	
to	8.4	million	hryvnias	(around	US$400,000);	On	1	January	2017,	UINP	had	
41	employees;	data	from	the	official	report	of	UINP,	http://memory.gov.ua/
page/zvit-ukrainskogo-institutu-natsionalnoi-pam-yati-z-realizatsii-der-
zhavnoi-politiki-u-sferi-vidn,	accessed	on	16	February	2017.	
12	 Reports	that	Poroshenko	is	dissatisfied	with	some	elements	of	Viatrovych’s	
policy,	although	unconfirmed,	deserve	attention.	The	amendments	to	the	
decommunisation	laws	of	April	2015	discussed	below	were	most	likely	in-
troduced	under	pressure	from	the	Presidential	Administration.	The	gesture	
of	the	Ukrainian	president	who	knelt	down	in	Warsaw	in	front	of	the	monu-
ment	to	the	victims	of	the	Volhynia	Massacre	(on	6	July	2016)	was	dissonant	
with	UINP’s	‘political	line’.	
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also	the	nationalist	element	as	a	lower	priority	(this	is	manifested	
above	all	 in	the	context	of	 the	evaluation	of	OUN	and	the	UPA).	
The	institute	he	directs	also	continues	issues	of	Ukrainian	histori-
cal	policy	concerning	the	more	distant	past,	such	as	the	memory	
of	 the	Holodomor	 (with	 an	 interesting	 shift	 of	 accent	 from	 the	
famine	itself	to	resistance	to	collectivisation,	including	the	insur-
gent	movement	in	1930–1932),	the	Mazepa	Uprising	against	Russia	
(early	18th	century)	and	the	deportation	of	Crimean	Tatars	in	1944.	
Preserving	the	memory	of	the	Revolution	of	Dignity,	above	all	by	
collecting	reports	of	its	participants,	has	also	been	a	very	impor-
tant	part	of	UINP’s	activity.	
The	institute	and	its	director	act	firmly,	disregarding	the	opinions	
prevalent	 in	 the	public	 sphere.	Their	ambition	 is	 to	 shape	 these	
opinions.	 They	 want	 to	 be	 ‘decommunisers’	 not	 only	 of	 street	
names	but	also	of	people’s	minds.	They	understand	that	the	war-
time	 patriotic	mobilisation	which	 is	 viewed	 by	 a	 section	 of	 the	
public	(including	themselves)	as	a	comfortable	situation	and	not	
an	 inconvenience,	offers	 them	a	unique	chance.	 If	 they	are	able	
to	act	for	a	sufficient	period	of	time,	especially	influencing	school	
education,	they	may	achieve	durable	success.	They	visibly	do	not	
care	about	 the	 fact	 that	 this	 success	may	 inflict	 serious	 reputa-
tional	and	political	losses	on	Kyiv	in	international	relations,	espe-
cially	with	Poland,	the	European	Union	and	Israel.	
The	activity	of	UINP	has	not	met	with	serious	resistance	(except	
for	several	hooligan	attacks	on	its	Kyiv	office	and	the	surprisingly	
low	number	of	complaints	about	 local	name	changes).	However,	
it	 is	difficult	 to	determine	now	what	Ukrainians’	real	views	are	
concerning	historical	issues;	wartime	does	not	contribute	to	the	
freedom	of	 expressing	opinions	 that	 are	 contrary	 to	 the	official	
narrative,	 and	 it	 also	 influences	 the	way	 sociologists	 formulate	
questions13.	The	answer	‘I	don’t	know’	or	‘difficult	to	say’	very	of-
13	 Cf.	the	Report	of	the	Institute	of	Political	Studies	of	the	Polish	Academy	of	Sci-
ences	and	the	National	Centre	for	Culture	entitled	Ukraińcy o historii, kulturze 
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ten	means	‘I	don’t	want	to	say’	or	‘I’m	afraid	to	speak	my	mind’.	The	
statement	 that	 decommunisation	 is	 unnecessary	 (58%)	 to	 some	
respondents	means	a	declaration	of	resistance,	to	others	indiffer-
ence,	etc.	Both	genuine	indifference	and	declaring	to	the	pollster	
that	it	 is	contrary	to	one’s	beliefs	contributes	to	the	tendency	to	
automatically	accept	the	new	narrative.	In	turn,	the	new	narra-
tive,	as	people	become	used	to	it,	begins	–	also	without	reflection	
–	to	be	accepted	as	their	own.	
What	 speaks	 volumes	 about	 Ukrainians’	 opinions	 on	 history	 is	
a	comparison	of	answers	to	the	question	about	the	blame	of	Poles	
and	Ukrainians	 in	mutual	relations	before	and	after	the	Revolu-
tion	of	Dignity	and	the	war14.	Within	this	timeframe	the	number	of	
respondents	believing	that	both	nations	are	to	blame	has	dropped	
from	33%	to	8%,	and	the	number	of	those	who	are	convinced	that	
only	the	Polish	side	 is	guilty	has	fallen	from	14%	to	8%	(the	per-
centage	of	respondents	who	are	of	the	opinion	that	Ukrainians	are	
the	only	guilty	ones	has	remained	at	the	same	level	of	5%).	What	
has	increased	(from	22%	to	45%)	is	the	number	of	people	avoiding	
expressing	their	opinion,	who	chose	the	answer	 ‘difficult	 to	say’	
or	said	that	none	of	the	sides	is	to	blame	(from	26%	to	34%),	which	
the	authors	of	the	survey	also	interpret	as	a	form	of	avoiding	the	
answer	and	a	desire	to	hide	their	beliefs,	which	in	the	respondent’s	
opinion	are	contrary	to	the	pollster’s	expectations15.	The	latter	as-
pect	need	to	be	taken	into	consideration	during	an	analysis	of	all	
Ukrainian	public	opinion	polls	conducted	over	the	past	few	years.	
According	 to	 polls,	 there	 has	 been	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 positive	
perception	of	OUN	and	the	UPA	(clearer	 in	the	case	of	 the	 latter	
i stosunkach polsko-ukraińskich. Raport z badania ilościowego i jakościowego,	
Warsaw	2017,	for	example,	on	pp.	38	(footnote	19)	and	60.	More	references	to	
this	Report	will	be	made	in	further	sections	of	this	paper.	
14	 Ibidem,	p.	60.	
15	 It	is	worth	adding	here	that	the	survey	response	rate	in	this	case	was	65.2%	
(ibidem,	page	5),	which	means	that	one	in	three	selected	respondents	refused	
to	answer	the	question.	
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organisation).	The	degree	of	acceptance	of	the	UPA	has	already	sur-
passed	50%;	it	is	treated	mainly	as	an	organisation	which	fought	for	
Ukraine’s	independence16.	The	latter	is	above	all	an	effect	of	many	
years	of	school	education	and	therefore	signifies	–	contrary	to	the	
conclusions	of	the	report’s	authors	–	a	further	increase	in	the	pro-
portion	of	positive	evaluations	of	the	organisation	with	the	ongo-
ing	generation	change.	Positive	evaluations	of	Stepan	Bandera	are	
much	rarer	(36%),	but	also	in	this	case	there	is	an	upward	trend.	
The	changes	noted	 in	the	report	prove	that	 the	new	narrative	of	
national	remembrance	is	becoming	entrenched	and	that	the	pro-
portion	of	people	manifesting	a	reconciliatory	stance	and	willing	
to	respect	the	point	of	view	of	both	sides	is	decreasing.	However,	
the	percentage	of	respondents	whose	opinion	is	unknown	means	
that	such	data	need	to	be	treated	with	great	caution.	
16	 Ibidem,	p.	48.
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II. a lenIn-free ukraIne – 
decommunIsaTIon In acTIon
While	in	the	western	districts	of	Ukraine	(above	all	in	Eastern	Gali-
cia)	a	decommunisation	of	the	public	space	(the	removal	of	statues	
of	Communist	leaders,	change	of	the	names	of	places,	streets,	etc.	
associated	with	the	Communist	system	and	the	names	of	 the	pa-
trons	of	institutions)	was	carried	out	in	the	early	1990s,	hundreds	of	
statues	of	Lenin,	thousands	of	monuments	and	plaques	commemo-
rating	the	establishment	and	operation	of	the	Communist	system	
could	still	be	seen	in	the	rest	of	the	country	in	autumn	2013,	nu-
merous	places	there	still	had	Soviet	names,	and	tens	of	thousands	
of	street	and	institution	names	still	referred	to	Communist	times.	
The	Leninfall	in	winter	2014	made	the	completion	of	this	process	
inevitable.	On	9	April	2015,	the	Verkhovna	Rada	(parliament)	of	
Ukraine	adopted	an	act	banning	totalitarian	symbolism	recognis-
ing	 “the	Communist	 totalitarian	 regime	 existing	 in	 1917–1991	in	
Ukraine”	 and	 “the	national-socialist	 (Nazi)	 totalitarian	 regime”	
as	criminal	and	imposing	a	ban	on	the	propagation	thereof	(this	
ban	does	not	 extend	 to	 spreading	 the	 ideologies	 linked	 to	 these	
regimes,	which	however	is	not	explicitly	written	down)17	and	the	
use	of	their	symbols	in	public	life	and	in	the	mass	media18.	One	ex-
17	 This	act	also	imposed	a	ban	on	using	the	word	‘Communist’	in	the	names	of	
organisations	and	institutions,	which	led	to	the	banning	of	the	Communist	
Party	of	Ukraine.	
18	 The	act	classifies	as	symbols	of	the	Communist	regime:	the	symbols	of	the	
USSR,	the	Ukrainian	Soviet	Socialist	Republic	and	other	Soviet	republics	and	
European	‘people’s	democracies’	(inverted	commas	as	in	the	original)	unless	
these	are	the	currently	applicable	symbols	of	these	countries,	the	national	
anthems	of	the	USSR	and	Soviet	republics,	any	symbols	using	the	hammer	
and	sickle,	monuments	and	other	depictions	of	activists	of	the	Communist	
movement	and	Soviet	government	authorities	and	those	commemorating	
events	from	the	history	of	the	Communist	movement	and	the	USSR	(with	the	
exception	of	those	linked	to	struggle	with	the	‘Nazi	occupiers’	and	to	Ukrain-
ian	science	and	culture)	as	well	as	names	of	places,	administration	units	and	
other	topographic	objects	linked	to	the	history	of	the	Communist	movement	
and	the	USSR	and	their	activists	(with	the	same	exceptions	as	in	the	case	of	
monuments).	The	ban	on	the	use	of	Nazi	symbols	has	a	much	narrower	scope:	
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ception	was	made	for	Soviet	symbols	at	cemeteries	and	on	monu-
ments	commemorating	World	War	II.	The	ban	also	does	not	cover	
museum,	 research	 (including	publications)	 and	historical	 reen-
tactment	activities.	A	norm	penalising	 the	propagation	of	Com-
munist	and	Nazi	symbolism	was	added	to	the	criminal	code.	Via-
trovych	(the	author	of	the	project),	however,	had	to	give	up,	most	
likely	under	political	pressure,	the	idea	of	marking	23	August	(the	
anniversary	of	signing	the	Ribbentrop–Molotov	Pact)	as	the	Day	
of	Remembrance	of	the	Victims	of	the	Communist	and	Nazi	To-
talitarian	Regimes19.	Two	years	later,	UINP	returned	to	this	idea	
in	a	draft	national	holiday	reform	(see	below).	
The	content	of	the	aforementioned	act	reveals	an	important	ele-
ment	of	Ukraine’s	historical	policy	which	has	already	been	pre-
sent	for	some	time20:	 treating	Nazism	and	communism	(and	not	
only	 so-called	 Stalinism)	 as	 equally	 totalitarian	 and	 equally	
criminal	regimes	 that	equally	deserve	 international	condemna-
tion	 (the	proposal	 to	hold	 ‘Nuremberg	 II’	 trials,	 establishing	 an	
international	court	for	Communist	crimes,	has	been	repeated	in	
Ukrainian	political	writing	since	the	1990s)21.	Presumably,	one	of	
the	motifs	behind	such	a	categorical	approach	to	the	issue	under	
discussion	was	the	deepening	divide	between	Kyiv	and	Moscow.	
it	covers	the	name	NSDAP,	its	symbols,	propaganda	slogans,	the	speeches	of	
its	leaders	and	the	emblem	and	flag	of	the	Third	Reich	(thus	the	ban	does	not	
extend	to	symbols	of	Nazi	military	units	including	SS	troops	and	modern	
neo-Nazi	symbols).	
19	 Cf.	 Volodymyr	 Viatrovych,	 Chetver. Parlament. Dekomunizatsiya	 (a	 blog	
post	published	on	8	April	2015,	one	day	before	the	debate	concerning	the	de-
communisation	laws),	http://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/viatrovych/	
552578abe297e/,	accessed	on	9	April	2015.	
20	 Cf.,	for	example,	the	article	by	Yuri	Shapoval,	a	well-known	historian	repre-
senting	the	middle	generation	Hitler, Stalin i Ukrayina: bezzhalni stratehiyi,	www.
istpravda.com.ua/articles/2013.05/123358/,	accessed	on	9	May	2017	(at	the	same	
time	the	article	was	re-published	on	the	main	page	of	Istorychna	Pravda).	
21	 The	same	equality	sign	can	also	be	found	in	the	latest	commemorations,	for	
example,	on	the	plaque	next	to	the	side	gate	to	the	Kyiv	NKVD	headquarters	
(it	also	served	as	temporary	Gestapo	headquarters)	mentioning	‘tens	of	thou-
sands	repressed	by	the	totalitarian	Nazi	and	Communist	regimes’	linked	to	
this	particular	place.	
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1,320	monuments	 and	busts	of	Lenin	and	 1,069	monuments	 and	
busts	 commemorating	 other	 Communist	 leaders	 and	 events	
linked	to	Communism22,	and	an	unidentified	number	of	plaques23	
were	removed	between	mid	2015	and	the	end	of	2016.	The	monu-
ments	that	have	remained	intact	include	the	monument	to	Shchors	
(a	Bolshevik	commander	during	the	Independence	War)	in	Kyiv24,	
a	monument	to	Fyodor	Sergeyev	nicknamed	Artem	(a	Bolshevik	
activist	 from	Donbas)	 in	 Svyatohirsk25,	 and	 also	 –	 at	 least	 until	
winter	2017	–	a	bust	of	Marx	in	the	Kyiv-based	Roshen	confection-
ery	 factory.	A	Leonid	Brezhnev	bust	has	also	been	 left	 intact	 in	
the	heart	 of	Kamianske	 (a	historical	 name	 returned	 to	 the	 city	
formerly	known	as	Dniprodzerzhynsk).	For	obvious	reasons,	de-
communisation	 has	 not	 covered	 the	 territories	 that	 remain	 out	
of	the	control	of	the	Ukrainian	government.	Most	of	the	removed	
monuments	are	kept	in	the	warehouses	of	municipal	companies;	
there	are	plans	 to	create	an	open-air	museum	with	Communist	
monument	sculptures.	
The	removal	of	statues	of	Lenin	has	been	of	great	importance.	As	
a	rule,	they	occupied	key	symbolic	places:	on	the	market	square,	
on	the	crossing	of	the	main	streets,	in	front	of	local	government	
headquarters,	 dominating,	 along	 with	 monuments	 commemo-
rating	 the	 Great	 Patriotic	 War,	 heroes	 in	 the	 symbolic	 space	
(monuments	 to	Shevchenko,	 far	 less	numerous,	 rarely	occupied	
similarly	prominent	places).	Thus	 their	absence	removed	one	of	
22	 For	example,	the	colossal	monument	to	the	Cavalry	Army	near	Brody	of	great	
artistic	value	has	been	removed.	Its	bronze	part	was	stolen	by	local	scrap	col-
lectors,	and	the	local	administration	only	had	to	remove	the	steel	framework.	
23	 These	 and	 further	 numerical	 data	 have	 been	 taken	 from	 Viatrovych’s	
blog	 post	 of	 27	December	 2016,	 http://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/
viatrovych/58624d866bb36/,	accessed	on	27	December	2016.
24	 Its	destruction	was	opposed	by	Viatrovych	himself	who	insisted	on	removal	
of	this	artistically	valuable	monument	from	its	very	tall	plinth	in	an	undam-
aged	condition.	In	May	2017,	it	was	still	standing	covered	with	a	blue-and-
yellow	veil.	
25	 This	monument,	 is	 a	20th	 century	 sculpture	masterpiece	and	recognised	
as	a	historical	monument,	is	22	m	high	and	is	located	next	to	the	military	
frontline.	
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the	main	tools	of	Soviet	dominance	in	the	public	space	in	its	sym-
bolic	aspect.	As	a	rule,	only	the	sculptures	and	inscriptions	were	
removed,	while	the	plinths	were	 left	intact,	alone	may	presume	
this	is	for	mainly	technical	reasons.	In	some	places,	paintings	or	
makeshift	 installations	 commemorating	 the	Heavenly	Hundred	
(as	in	Poltava)	or	Fatherland	(as	in	Lubny)	have	been	placed	on	the	
plinths.	In	western	Ukraine,	the	plinths	of	the	previously	‘decom-
munised’	monuments	have	been	partly	removed	and	partly	used	
as	 the	base	 for	 religious	monuments.	 So	 in	 general,	 the	plinths	
(or	the	places	left	after	monuments	that	have	been	removed	com-
pletely)	are	waiting	for	a	new	‘host’,	and	local	governments	would	
rather	 not	 use	 them	 as	 the	 base	 for	 new	monuments	 (many	 of	
these	are	still	created	in	Ukraine	regardless	of	the	tough	econom-
ic	 situation).	 Monuments	 commemorating	 the	 heroes	 from	 the	
Heavenly	Hundred	or	those	killed	in	Donbas	have	not	taken	the	
space	once	occupied	by	Lenins	and	Chekists.	
Patriotic	circles	are	increasingly	calling	for	the	demand	removal	
of	monuments	 to	 ‘Russian-Ukrainian	brotherhood’	 (such	 as	 the	
Kyiv	 monument	 commemorating	 the	 anniversary	 of	 Ukraine’s	
unification	with	Russia,	the	so-called	‘Yoke	of	Freedom’,	or	a	simi-
lar	 monument	 in	 Pereiaslav)	 and	 monuments	 to	 Russian	 state	
leaders	(especially	the	monument	to	Empress	Catherine	II	which	
was	reconstructed	over	ten	years	ago	in	Odessa).	UINP	is	willing	
to	back	up	these	expectations.	However,	it	has	not	yet	gone	so	far	
as	to	support	them	directly,	most	likely	for	tactical	reasons;	these	
monuments	are	not	covered	by	the	Decommunisation	Act,	while	
the	remembrance	policy	is	a	prerogative	of	the	local	governments.	
However,	surprising,	unconventional	moves	have	also	been	made	
in	this	area:	in	May	2017,	the	monument	to	Bohdan	Khmelnytsky	
in	Chernihiv	has	been	reoriented	so	that	it	no	longer	points	north-
wards,	in	the	direction	of	Moscow26.	
26	 Khmelnytsky	 is	 a	 controversial	 character	 in	 Ukraine:	 on	 the	 one	 hand	
Ukraine	under	his	rule	liberated	itself	from	Poland	and	built	the	foundations	
of	its	statehood,	but	on	the	other	it	was	he	who	surrendered	the	country	to	
Moscow,	for	which	he	has	been	strongly	criticised,	amongst	others	by	Taras	
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The	names	of	25	communities	and	987	places,	 including	32	cities	
(resolutions	to	this	effect	were	passed	in	parliament27)	and	of	al-
most	52,000	streets,	squares,	etc.	(in	this	case,	the	decisions	were	
made	 by	 local	 governments	 or,	 if	 these	 did	 not	 take	measures,	
by	 bodies	 of	 the	 territorial	 state	 administration)	were	 changed	
in	 2015–2016.	 There	 are	 no	 data	 concerning	 renaming	 compa-
nies,	schools,	community	centres,	etc.	However,	to	the	best	of	our	
knowledge,	ten	of	thousands	of	them	have	changed	their	names,	
and	this	process	is	far	from	being	over.	Two	oblasts	have	retained	
their	old	names:	Dnipropetrovsk	and	Kirovohrad,	because	the	list	
of	the	oblasts	is	written	down	in	the	constitution	and	the	present	
Verkhovna	Rada	has	been	unable	to	collect	the	300	votes	required	
to	amend	the	constitution	even	regarding	this	issue.	
The	change	of	city	names	has	met	with	much	stronger	resistance	
(although	 only	 nine	 of	 the	 numerous	 court	 complaints	 reached	
the	Supreme	Court	by	the	end	of	201628),	especially	in	the	two	in-
dustrial	 metropolises	 of	 Dnieper	 Ukraine:	 Dnipropetrovsk	 and	
Kirovohrad.	 In	both	cases	a	major	section	of	 the	 local	elites	and	
a	 large	proportion	of	residents	opposed	the	change	and	felt	that	
restoring	the	previous	names	was	unacceptable;	these	cities	were	
previously	named	after	 the	Russian	empresses	Catherine	(Ekat-
erina):	Ekaterinoslav	 and	Elisabeth	 (Elizaveta):	Elizavetgrad.	 In	
the	former	case	the	compromise	solution	was	to	sanction	the	col-
loquial	name	of	the	city,	Dnipro	(i.e.	the	Dnieper)	that	has	been	in	
use	for	decades,	and	in	the	latter	case	the	local	government	had	
to	accept	another	memorial	name:	Kropyvnytskyi	(in	honour	of	
the	playwright,	actor	and	patriotic	activist	linked	to	this	city	who	
Shevchenko.	In	summer	2017,	suggestions	were	heard	in	Kyiv	that	the	his-
torical	name	Proskuriv	should	be	restored	to	Khmelnytskyi	(an	oblast	capital	
city	in	Podolia).	
27	 The	names	of	places	located	in	Donbas	and	Crimea,	the	territories	outside	
Kyiv’s	control,	have	also	been	changed.	In	the	case	of	Crimea,	the	Crimean	
Tatar	names	have,	as	a	rule,	been	brought	back.	
28	 The	protests	were	mitigated	to	a	great	extent	when	it	turned	out	that	the	
change	of	the	city	or	street	name	does	not	entail	the	need	to	change	identity	
cards,	blank	forms,	stamps,	etc.	early.
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died	in	1910).	A	somewhat	grotesque	conflict	took	place	 in	Kom-
somolsk	near	Kremenchuk,	which	had	to	accept	the	name	of	one	
of	the	villages	on	the	territory	of	which	the	city	was	built	in	the	
1930s:	Horishni-Plavni	(Upper	Meadows);	the	name	was	resisted	
probably	because	 its	 second	part	 is	 similar	 to	 the	Russian	word	
‘plavki’	(swimming	trunks),	but	UINP	did	not	yield	to	the	protests	
and	the	complaint	was	rejected.	
In	the	process	of	renaming	locations,	efforts	were	made	to	bring	
back	their	historical	names	(in	those	cases	where	they	were	avail-
able	–	many	places,	especially	industrial	cities,	were	established	
in	 Soviet	 times).	 New	memorial	 names,	 traditional	 of	 not	 only	
Soviet	but	also	earlier,	Russian,	toponymy,	were	introduced	only	
in	rare	cases.	Four	villages	received	names	linked	to	the	tradition	
of	 the	Ukrainian	People’s	Republic29,	five	others	were	named	 in	
honour	of	soldiers	killed	in	Donbas	who	originated	from	those	vil-
lages30,	and	two	located	in	the	occupied	territories	were	named	in	
honour	of	those	killed	nearby31.	No	proposals	of	names	associated	
with	the	OUN-UPA	traditions	have	been	made.	Two	places	inhab-
ited	by	the	Bulgarian	minority	which	used	to	be	named	after	Bul-
garian	Communists	were	 renamed	 after	 Bulgarian	 19th	 century	
patriotic	activists.	
29	 Bohdanivske	(formerly	Zhovtneve,	October)	in	Kharkiv	Oblast,	Hordiyen-
kivtsi	 (formerly	 Shlyakh	Nezamozhnyka,	 Poor	Man’s	 Road)	 in	 Kherson	
Oblast,	Zahrodske	(formerly	Komunar)	in	Khmelnytskyi	Oblast	and	Syni-
ozhupannyki	(formerly	Petrovske,	named	in	honour	of	Grigory	Petrovsky,	
who	is	also	the	patron	of	Dnipropetrovsk).	Only	Zahrodske	received	the	name	
of	a	person,	a	general	of	the	Ukrainian	People’s	Republic,	while	the	other	were	
named	after	military	units.
30	 Susval	(formerly	Zhovtneve)	in	Volyn	Oblast,	Tokarivka	(formerly	Kudryavt-
sivka,	named	after	a	local	cacique)	in	Mykolaiv	Oblast,	Maksymivka	(for-
merly	Oktyabrske,	meaning	also	October	but	in	Russian)	in	Dniprope	trovsk	
Oblast,	 Iline	 (formerly	Panfilivka,	 probably	 in	honour	 of	 one	 of	 the	Red	
Army	commanders	of	1941)	in	Zaporizhia	Oblast	and	Dobropasove	(formerly	
Chervonyi	Lyman)	in	Dnipropetrovsk	Oblast.	In	Susval,	the	residents,	in-
cluding	the	father	of	the	fallen	soldier,	have	opposed	the	new	name,	and	the	
place	will	most	likely	be	renamed	again.	
31	 Uzhivka	(formerly	Leninske)	and	Stupakove	(formerly	Krasnyi	Pakhar,	Red	
Ploughman)	–	both	in	Donetsk	Oblast.	
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For	obvious	reasons,	many	more	streets	and	squares	received	me-
morial	 names.	We	 do	 not	 have	 collective	 data	 to	 this	 effect;	 it	 is	
only	 known	 that	 34	out	 of	 51,500	streets	 have	 been	 named	 after	
Bandera,	and	in	some	cases	also	after	other	OUN-UPA	leaders32.	In	
April	2017,	Odessa	city	council	repealed	the	decision	of	the	head	of	
the	oblast	state	administration	concerning	renaming	some	of	the	
streets,	 bringing	 back	 the	 names	 of	 the	 patrons	 associated	with	
World	War	II,	and	also,	for	example,	Valentina	Tereshkova	(the	first	
woman	to	have	flown	in	space,	 later	a	Soviet	and	Russian	states-
woman).	 In	turn,	the	changes	of	the	names	whose	patrons	really	
met	the	criteria	of	the	Decommunisation	Act	were	not	questioned.	
This	suggests	 that	similar	over-zealousness	may	be	seen	 in	other	
locations.	 Naming	 one	 of	 Odessa’s	 streets	 after	 Shukhevych	 did	
not	encounter	any	protests.	 In	 turn,	 the	city	government	 in	Mu-
kachevo	(Zakarpattia	Oblast)	in	the	first	days	of	July	2017	replaced	
Bandera	and	Shukhevych	streets	with	Cardinal	Huzar	and	Metro-
politan	Sheptytsky	streets33;	this	was	an	element	of	the	local	elite’s	
struggle	with	the	unaccepted	governor.	However,	it	cannot	be	ruled	
out	that	other	local	governments	will	follow	their	example.	
As	 in	Eastern	Galicia,	where	a	similar	operation	was	conducted	
more	than	twenty	years	ago,	new	address	plaques	for	many	years	
will	be	placed	along	the	old	ones,	making	it	easier	for	older	gen-
erations	to	find	their	way	around,	and	serving	as	a	history	lesson	
to	the	younger	generations.	
32	 Bandera,	Shukhevych,	etc.	streets	are	commonplace	in	the	western	oblasts;	
these	names	were	given	earlier,	often	in	the	1990s.	Streets	named	after	these	
leaders	began	to	be	named	in	southern	and,	less	frequently,	eastern	Ukraine	
after	2015.	In	2016,	a	section	of	Kyiv’s	internal	circular	road	was	named	after	
Bandera,	and	in	2017,	its	extension	on	the	left	bank	of	the	Dnieper	was	named	
for	Shukhevych	(the	first	decision	did	not	meet	with	any	controversies,	while	
the	second	one	provoked	a	dispute;	attempts	have	been	made	to	contest	it	in	
court,	so	far	unsuccessfully).	
33	 Cardinal	Lubomyr	Huzar	(1933–2017),	the	head	of	the	Greek	Catholic	Church	in	
2001–2011,	enjoyed	enormous	respect	in	Ukraine,	also	among	non-Catholics.	
Metropolitan	Archbishop	Andrey	Sheptytsky	(1865–1944)	was	a	restorer	of	this	
Church	and	a	patron	of	the	Ukrainian	national	movement	in	Eastern	Galicia.	
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Another	rarely	noticed	element	of	decommunisation	was	the	fact	
that	Poroshenko	in	2015	removed	Soviet	elements	from	the	names	
of	military	units,	above	all	the	names	of	the	awards	they	received	
which	were	 integral	parts	of	 their	names34	 and	 shifting	 the	Fa-
therland	Defenders’	Day	from	23	February	to	14	October,	the	for-
mer	Red	Army	Day,	which	is	also	celebrated	in	Russia	as	Father-
land	Defenders’	Day	on	 the	day	of	Pokrova,	 i.e.	Mother	of	God’s	
Care,	one	of	the	most	important	holidays	in	Ukrainian	Orthodoxy,	
known	for	more	than	ten	years	above	all	as	the	symbolic	anniver-
sary	of	 the	establishment	of	 the	UPA.	Regardless	of	 the	 contro-
versies	that	almost	direct	reference	to	this	formation’s	tradition	
may	provoke,	 shifting	 the	celebration	date	 is	 an	 important	 step	
distancing	the	Ukrainian	tradition	from	the	Russian	one.	
Another	 stage	 of	 decommunisation,	 according	 to	 UINP,	 will	 be	
a	calendar	reform,	i.e.	replacing	 ‘Communist’	holidays	with	 ‘na-
tional’	 ones.	 The	 draft	 published	 by	 the	 Institute	 in	 February	
2017	which	was	adjusted	in	April	2017	after	‘public	consultations’	
which	were	not	precisely	 identified35	not	only	shifts	the	holiday	
commemorating	 the	end	of	World	War	 II	 from	9	to	8	May	 (both	
days	will	maintain	the	status	of	national	holidays)	but	also	intro-
duces	a	number	of	new	national	holidays,	 including	the	Father-
land	Defenders’	Day,	as	non-working	days.	
The	draft	 limits	 the	number	of	non-working	holidays	and	 intro-
duces	a	cycle	distributed	evenly	during	the	year	of	holidays	linked	
to	 national	 symbols	 (February	–	National	 Emblem	 Day,	 March	–
National	Anthem	Day,	June	–	Constitution	Day,	non-working	holi-
day,	September	–	Flag	Day),	and	also	introduces	six	‘mournful	days’,	
34	 Thus,	for	example,	the	24th	Samara-Ulyanovsk,	Berdychiv,	Iron,	Awards	of	
October	Revolution,	three	times	Red	Banner,	Suvorov’s,	Bogdan	Khmelny-
tsky	Mechanised	Brigade	named	after	Prince	Danylo	of	Halych	(the	last	sec-
tion	of	the	name	was	added	in	2001)	became	the	24th	Separate	Berdichiv	Iron	
Mechanised	Brigade	named	after	Prince	Danylo	of	Halych.	
35	 www.memory.gov.ua/news/institut-pidgotuvav-novu-redaktsiyu-zakono-
proektu-pro-svyata,	accessed	on	10	May	2017.
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including	 the	 Day	 of	 Remembrance	 of	 the	 Holocaust	 Victims	
(29	September,	the	anniversary	of	the	Babi	Yar	Massacre),	the	Day	
of	 Remembrance	 of	 the	 Victims	 of	 the	 Crimean	 Tatar	 Genocide	
(18	May)	and	the	Day	of	Remembrance	of	the	Victims	of	the	Com-
munist	 and	Nazi	Regimes	 (23	August).	Contrary	 to	 initial	 inten-
tions,	1	May	will	remain	a	non-working	holiday	(but	will	last	only	
one	day)	and	8	May	will	be	an	‘international	holiday’	but	will	be	
a	working	day.	The	draft	has	not	yet	been	submitted	to	the	Verk-
hovna	Rada,	and	it	is	not	known	when	this	may	happen.	However,	
it	does	set	a	direction	for	action;	an	emphasis	on	state-building	ele-
ments,	remembrance	of	the	victims	of	totalitarianism	and	of	the	
latest	developments	(the	anniversary	of	the	beginning	of	the	Revo-
lution	of	Dignity	will	be	a	national	holiday,	while	the	anniversary	
of	the	massacre	of	20	February	2014	will	be	a	mournful	day).	
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III. The real end of The GreaT PaTrIoTIc war
The	lengthy	dispute	between	the	concepts	of	 the	Great	Patriotic	
War	(fought	by	the	USSR	and	its	allies	against	Nazi	Germany	in	
1941–1945)	 and	World	War	 II	 (fought	 by	 the	 Allies	 against	 Nazi	
Germany	and	 Japan	 in	 1939–1945)	was	 radically	 resolved	by	 the	
Act	on	the	Commemoration	of	the	Victory	over	Nazism	in	World	
War	 II	 in	 1939–1945,	 adopted	 on	 9	April	 2015.	The	 notion	 of	 the	
‘Great	Patriotic	War’	was	removed	from	public	discourse,	and	 it	
was	recognised	that,	as	in	Europe,	the	anniversary	of	the	end	of	
the	war	was	on	8	and	not	9	May.	This	day	was	named	the	Day	of	
Remembrance	and	Reconciliation,	and	already	in	the	same	year	
red	poppies	designed	in	a	way	that	resembles	a	bullet	wound	be-
came	the	symbol36.	However,	9	May,	 the	traditional	Victory	Day	
has	maintained	a	non-working	holiday	renamed	as	the	Day	of	Vic-
tory	over	Nazism.	This	was	a	gesture	towards	the	ever	fewer	World	
War	II	veterans	and	also	a	still	significant	number	of	Ukrainians	
attached	to	this	holiday.	One	proof	of	the	fact	that	this	was	a	tem-
porary	 concession	 is	 the	 aforementioned	 draft	 calendar	 reform	
which	envisages	that	8	and	not	9	May	will	be	a	national	holiday	
and	a	non-working	day.	
This	 change	 was	 accompanied	 by	 a	 new	 narrative	 concerning	
World	War	II	and	the	role	Ukraine	played	in	it.	For	Ukraine,	treat-
ed	as	a	non-sovereign	but	separate	political	entity,	the	war	began	
already	on	1	September	1939	(the	Nazi	bombardment	of	Lviv,	the	
military	 engagement	 of	 Polish	 Army	 soldiers	 of	 Ukrainian	 na-
tional	 background),	 and	 even	 a	 little	 earlier	 (in	 some	 interpre-
tations,	 the	fights	 between	 the	Carpathian	Sich	 and	Hungarian	
troops	 in	March	 1939	marked	 Ukrainians’	 first	 encounter	 with	
Nazism37),	 and	 lasted	until	2	September	 1945,	 i.e.	 the	Surrender	
36	 And	also	so	that	they	could	be	seen	as	red-and-black	bows,	the	colours	of	the	
Bandera	movement	and	the	new	Ukrainian	nationalism.	Both	meanings	were	
certainly	intended.	
37	 The	Carpathian	Sich	were	the	self-defence	forces	of	Carpathian	Ukraine,	
an	ephemeral	state	established	in	Zakarpattia	at	the	time	of	the	collapse	of	
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of	Japan.	In	this	war	Ukraine	lost	8–10	million	people	(including	
1.5	million	Jews38);	this	is	the	third	largest	death	toll	(after	China	
–	15	million39	and	Russia	14	million),	ahead	of	Poland	(6	million)40.	
Its	soldiers	fought	mainly	as	part	of	the	Red	Army	(6	million),	the	
Polish	Army	(120,000),	the	UPA	(100,000)	and	the	armed	forces	
of	the	USA	(80,000)	and	the	British	Empire	(45,000)41.	As	part	of	
this	narrative,	the	Ukrainian	Insurgent	Army	(UPA)	is	viewed	as	
one	of	 the	Allied	 forces	which	 took	part	 in	 the	war	against	Na-
zism,	although	it	is	rarely	referred	to	as	a	belligerent.	Similarly,	
the	scale	of	Ukrainian	collaboration	with	Nazism	is	presented	as	
marginal,	especially	when	compared	to	the	massive	collaboration	
Czechoslovakia	that	was	promptly	annexed	(with	Hitler’s	consent)	by	Hun-
gary.	OUN	militants	from	Eastern	Galicia	formed	a	great	part	of	it.	
38	 The	estimated	number	of	Ukrainian	victims	of	the	Holocaust	is	as	a	rule	lower	
(850,000–900,000);	this	difference	can	be	a	result	of	the	fact	that	the	higher	
estimates	take	into	account	Jews	originating	from	Ukraine	who	were	killed	
outside	its	territory.	(Cf.	e.g.:	https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A5%D0
%BE%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%BA%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82_%D0%BD%D0%B
0_%D0%A3%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B5,	accessed	
on	5	June	2017,	where	both	estimates	are	mentioned	as	equally	valid).	This	
number	includes	individuals	who	had	Soviet,	Polish	and	Czechoslovak	(Za-
karpattian)	citizenship	before	1939.	
39	 Paying	attention	to	China’s	role	and	losses	in	World	War	II,	which	are	usually	
unnoticed	in	Europe,	is	an	interesting	thread	in	the	reflection	of	UINP	and	
circles	linked	to	it.
40	 Here	and	below,	quoted	from	UINP’s	brochure	Ukrayina u Druhyi svitovyi viyni,	
Kyiv	2015	and	the	work	Viyna i mif. Nevidoma druga svitova, UINP	i	Klub	Sime-
ynoho	Dozvilla,	Kharkiv	2016.	These	data	roughly	correspond	to	estimates	
generally	adopted	(which	are	also	full	of	discrepancies,	for	example,	in	the	
case	of	China	these	estimates	range	between	15	and	20	million	military	and	
civilian	victims),	although	dividing	the	losses	of	the	Soviet	Union	into	those	
sustained	by	Russia,	Ukraine	and	other	republics	poses	serious	methodologi-
cal	difficulties.	The	number	of	100,000	people	who	joined	and	left	the	ranks	
of	the	UPA	in	1942–1952	is	most	likely	an	overestimate.	
41	 In	some	publications	UINP	admits	that	Ukrainians	also	fought	on	the	side	
of	the	Axis	states:	with	Germany	up	to	250,000,	Romania	24,000,	Hungary	
20,000,	Slovakia	2,000	and	Croatia	1,500.	See:	Recommendations	concern-
ing	the	celebration	of	the	seventieth	anniversary	of	victory	over	Nazism,	
www.memory.gov.ua/news/rekmendatsii-schodo-zakhodiv-z-vidznaczen-
nya-u-2015-rotsi-70-i-richnitsi-peremogi-nad-natsism	accessed	on	29	April	
2015.	The	number	of	those	who	fought	on	the	side	of	Germany	must	include	
police	and	guard	formations;	in	other	cases	this	concerns	citizens	of	these	
countries	of	Ukrainian	ethnic	background.	
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of	Russians42.	The	conclusion	to	which	this	argumentation	leads	
is	 the	 view	 that	 “Ukraine	was	 included	 in	 the	 group	of	 the	UN	
founding	nations	in	recognition	of	the	Ukrainian	contribution	to	
the	victory	over	Nazism”43.	
One	of	the	elements	of	including	the	UPA	in	the	joint	victory	narra-
tive	are	attempts	of	reconciliation	between	the	veterans	of	both	for-
mations	which	takes	place	above	all	in	the	sphere	of	propaganda.	
The	president	and	the	head	of	parliament	invite	both	of	these	and	
also	veterans	of	 the	so-called	Anti-Terrorist	Operation	(ATO),	 i.e.	
the	present	war,	to	state	celebrations,	and	posters	presenting	‘the	
victors	over	Nazism’	from	both	formations	shaking	hands	appear	
on	city	streets	shortly	before	the	Remembrance/Victory	Day44.	
By	changing	the	official	name	of	the	conflict	of	1939–1945	and	pre-
senting	Ukraine	as	a	separate	 independent	entity	 taking	part	 in	
these	events,	UINP	intends	to	put	an	end	to	the	war	against	Ger-
many	being	treated	as	common	(all-Soviet)	and	instead	recognis-
ing	it	as	national,	fought	jointly	by	Ukrainians	from	various	forma-
tions	and	countries.	Breaking	the	bonds	with	Russia	in	this	area	
and	building	the	national	narrative	has	been	the	main	goal,	while	
bringing	the	perception	of	World	War	II	closer	to	the	way	this	war	
is	viewed	in	Western	Europe	was	of	secondary	importance.	
42	 Cf.,	e.g.	Viyna i mif. Nevidoma druha svitova,	op. cit.,	pages	117–121.	According	
to	the	figures	specified	there,	the	estimated	number	of	members	of	‘Ukrain-
ian’	collaborationist	formations	was	around	250,000,	while	the	number	of	
‘Russian’	ones	ranged	between	300,000	and	800,000.
43	 Ukrayina u Druhij...	op. cit.,	p.	26,	similar	wording	can	be	found	on	p.	22.	The-
ses	of	this	kind	have	already	appeared	:	cf.,	e.g.	Volodymyr	Lytvyn	(the	then	
head	of	Ukrainian	parliament),	‘Yedinstvo	natsii’	[in]	Holos Ukrayiny	no.	13	of	
24	January	2006,	claimed	that	“the	contribution	of	the	Ukrainian	nation	to	
the	victory	over	Nazi	Germany	and	its	allies	forced	the	United	Nations	to	re-
spect	its	interests.	Soviet	Ukraine	received	the	moral	right	to	unite	its	lands.	
The	stigma	of	the	Ribbentrop-Molotov	Pact	has	been	lifted	from	this	event”.
44	 The	specimen	of	the	poster	is	available	on	the	website	of	UINP:	http://www.
memory.gov.ua/page/ukrainska-druga-svitova,	accessed	on	20	May	2017.	
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IV. The Place of The uPa In The naTIonal 
TradITIon
A	 photograph	 presenting	 President	 Petro	 Poroshenko	 wear-
ing	a	military	jacket	and	the	inscription	‘cynical	bandera’	in	the	
place	where	the	user’s	name	is	usually	presented	appeared	on	Po-
roshenko’s	official	Facebook	profile	in	spring	201745.	The	posting	of	
this	photograph	can	be	viewed	as	proof	of	a	kind	of	carelessness	of	
the	people	in	charge	of	the	Ukrainian	president’s	image.	However,	
the	 inscription	proves	 that	 the	 term	 ‘Bandera/bandera’	 is	being	
decreasingly	linked	to	the	historical	leader	of	OUN,	and	is	becom-
ing	a	definition	of	a	certain	patriotic	option.	
The	Revolution	of	Dignity	in	which	young	people	from	national-
ist	 organisations	 (the	party	Svoboda46	 and	 the	marginal	 groups	
which	became	 integrated	 already	on	 the	Maidan	 into	 the	Right	
Sector47)	 played	 a	major,	 albeit	 not	 decisive,	 role,	 and	 then	 the	
war,	in	the	first	phase	of	which	volunteer	formations	consisting	
to	some	extent	of	members	of	these	organisations,	played	an	im-
mense	role,	contributed	 to	 increasing	 the	popularity	of	Ukrain-
ian	nationalism,	referring	to	the	tradition	of	OUN	and	the	UPA’s	
military	struggle.	This	was	on	the	one	hand	a	result	of	the	need	
for	a	distinct	tradition	of	armed	struggle	against	Russia,	and	on	
the	other	of	 the	clear	 image	of	 these	organisations,	 their	 rheto-
ric	and	symbols	which	attract	attention.	This	attractiveness	has	
45	 This	photograph	was	used	as	an	illustration	for	Mykhailo	Dublyansky’s	arti-
cle	Derzhava, yaka stala Batkivshchynoyu	(with	no	perceptible	link	to	its	con-
tent),	www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2017/04/14/7141248	accessed	on	18	April	
2017.	Here	‘Bandera’	means	a	Banderovets,	hence	the	small	letter.	This	phrase	
can	be	found,	albeit	rarely,	also	in	other	sources.	
46	 A	nationalist	political	party	which	drew	upon	the	OUN	Bandera	tradition	
and	agenda,	represented	in	parliament	in	2010–2015.	
47	 The	Right	Sector	is	the	place	occupied	by	radical	football	fans	at	Dynamo	Kyiv	
Stadium.	This	name	was	used	in	the	Maidan	to	create	a	joint	organisational	
platform	for	groups	of	football	fans	and	members	of	marginal	ultra-radical	
nationalist	and	neo-Nazi	groups.	Some	time	later	it	was	used	as	a	base	for	
a	political	party	which	has,	however,	remained	a	marginal	grouping.	
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been	bolstered	by	the	image	of	the	UPA	as	a	military	organisation	
which	heroically	 struggled	against	 the	occupier	promoted	since	
the	1990s	in	school	education	(this	image	of	the	UPA	has	been	pre-
sent	in	Ukrainian	school	textbooks	and	publications	addressed	to	
teachers	already	since	circa	1993–1994).
What	has	also	contributed	to	the	entrenchment	of	the	positive	im-
age	of	 the	UPA	and	Banderovtsy	 (with	a	better	or	worse	under-
standing	of	what	that	term	means)	is	Russian	propaganda,	brand-
ing	 the	 entire	 Maidan	 community	 as	 ‘Banderofascist’	 (in	 fact,	
radical	nationalists	formed	a	clear	minority	there)	and	reviving	
the	 old	 Soviet	 stereotype	which	 places	 an	 equals	 sign	 between	
fascism	on	the	one	side	and	Ukraine’s	struggle	for	independence	
against	 Russia	 on	 the	 other.	This	 kind	 of	 propaganda	 provoked	
an	 understandable	 response:	 if	 the	 enemy	 speaks	 so	 bad	 about	
Banderovtsy,	it	is	clear	they	are	bad	for	the	enemy,	ergo	they	are	
good	for	us.	This	also	provoked	another	response:	they	call	us	Ban-
derovtsy	to	defame	and	degrade	us	–	let’s	be	them	with	pride,	let’s	
raise	this	name	to	the	banners48.	
Bandera and Banderovtsy 
Stepan	 Bandera	 became	 the	 main	 ‘hero’	 of	 the	 Soviet	 anti-
Ukrainian	propaganda,	even	a	negative	symbol	of	the	 ‘West-
ern’	 Ukrainianness	 (cf.	 the	 contemptuous	 branding	 of	 the	
Ukrainian	language	as	‘Bandera	tongue’,	frequently	seen	until	
the	 1980s)	probably	because	of	his	name,	being	–	using	con-
temporary	 terminology	 –	 a	meme	per	 se,	 linguistically	 ‘for-
eign’	(the	origin	of	the	surname	Bandera	is	unclear)	and	at	the	
same	time	associated	with	the	words	‘band,	bandit’	(the	term	
48	 A	group	of	young	 Jewish	people	 from	the	Maidan	responded	to	 the	anti-
Semitic	statements	in	the	Russian	media	that	“zhydobanderovtsy”	(Jewish	
Banderovtsy)	predominate	on	the	Maidan	by	accepting	this	name	and	creat-
ing	a	symbol	of	Jewish	Ukrainian	patriotism:	the	menorah	with	the	Tryzub	
inside.	Later,	members	of	the	Jewish	Maidan	Sotnya	were	wearing	red-and-
black	skullcaps.	
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
9/
20
17
31
‘bandera’	 has	 been	used	 in	 the	meaning	 ‘Banderovets’	 since	
at	 least	 the	1950s).	The	role	played	by	Bandera	at	 the	time	of	
World	War	 II	 (he	was	 in	German	captivity	 in	 1941–1944)	did	
not	 predestine	 him	 to	 become	 a	 symbol	 of	 either	 the	 UPA’s	
struggle	or	the	crimes	committed	by	this	organisation;	other	
people	played	 the	main	 role	 in	both	 these	areas.	This	Soviet	
propaganda	 stereotype	has	been	 taken	over	by	 independent	
Ukraine,	reversing	the	signs.	
Bandera	himself,	even	though	it	 is	mainly	he	to	whom	mon-
uments	 are	 erected	 (most	 of	 them	 were	 built	 before	 2014),	
remains	 somewhat	 out	 of	 the	 way	 in	 this	 narrative.	 Offi-
cial	 (and	public,	where	present)	 remembrance	 is	 focused	on	
Banderovtsy	who	are	 identified	with	 the	UPA,	 the	 ‘steadfast	
army’	and	 its	commanders,	especially	Roman	Shukhevych49.	
It	is	they	who	are	treated	as	heroes,	it	is	their	struggle	that	is	
meant	 to	 inspire	 the	present	 soldiers,	 it	 is	 they	who	are	 the	
subject	of	hero-worship.	Bandera	only	–	if	it	can	be	put	this	way	
–	embodies	them.	
The	outbreak	of	the	war	froze	and	later	extinguished	the	previous-
ly	emerging	critical	reflection	on	the	Ukrainian	nationalist	move-
ment	during	World	War	II,	raising	the	issue	of	the	crimes	it	com-
mitted	against	Poles	and	also	Jews	and	Ukrainians	(the	latter	were	
the	 least	 frequent).	There	 is	now	no	return	to	 this	discussion.	As	
has	been	stated	by	Mykola	Riabchuk,	an	active	participant	of	the	
dispute	over	 the	UPA	before	2014:	“Our	 intelligentsia	and	society	
will	have	to	come	to	terms	with	the	past	in	a	fair	manner,	to	rec-
ognise	 its	unpleasant	or	disgraceful	cards.	But	we	cannot	do	this	
49	 Proof	of	Shukhevych’s	growing	role	in	the	Ukrainian	narrative	of	national	
remembrance	 includes,	 for	example,	his	 110th	birthday	 in	Lviv	 this	year,	
which	was	celebrated	with	pomp	even	though	this	date	coincided	with	the	
anniversary	of	the	Lviv	Pogrom	of	1941	in	which	some	of	the	soldiers	of	the	
collaborationist	 Nachtigall	 battalion	 led	 by	 Shukhevych	were	 engaged.	
Ukrainian	Jewish	organisations	unsuccessfully	appealed	for	the	celebrations	
to	be	cancelled.	
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according	to	the	Russian	paradigm	or	any	other	imposed	on	us	from	
the	outside”50.	In	other	words,	a	nation	engaged	in	war	cannot,	as	
intellectual	from	unthreatened	countries	would	like,	“to	look	at	the	
past	as	a	foreign	country”,	it	has	to	“make	a	choice	regarding	whom	
it	 supports	at	present”51.	When	the	public	climate	 in	Ukraine	be-
comes	conducive	to	liberal	and	anti-nationalist	reflection	again,	it	
will	already	be	resumed	by	new	people	and	in	a	new	way.	
In	2015,	after	the	Great	Patriotic	War	category	was	officially	re-
jected,	UPA	tradition	could	be	made	part	of	the	positive	narrative	
of	national	remembrance	in	a	new	manner52.	This	tradition	was	
alive	 above	 all	 in	 Eastern	Galicia	 and	Volhynia.	However,	 after	
a	quarter-century	of	the	functioning	of	Ukraine’s	uniform	school	
education	system,	 it	can	no	 longer	be	said	 that	 it	was	unknown	
outside	 this	 area.	This	 is	 proven	 by	 the	 emergence	 of	 popular	
teaching	materials	devoted	to	Bandera	and	the	UPA	targeted	in	an	
obvious	way	at	residents	of	central	and	eastern	Ukraine53.
The	Act	 on	 the	 Legal	 Status	 and	Honouring	 the	Memory	 of	 the	
Fighters	 for	 Ukraine’s	 Independence	 in	 the	 20th	 Century	 (part	
50	 Mykola	Riabchuk,	Svitlo vid temriavy.	Andreas Umland, pamyat’ pro UPA i yevro-
intehratsiya Ukrayiny,	www.istpravda.com.ua/columns/2017/01/14/149456	ac-
cessed	on	16	January	2016.	This	text	is	a	variant	of	the	article	for	the	portal	
Raam	op	Rusland	quoted	above.	
51	 Yuliya	Yurchuk,	Proshloye pod pritselom amnezii: pamiat’ ob OUN i UPA v Volyn-
skom regione na primere pamyatnika Klimu Savuru,	[in]	www1.ku-eichstaett.
de/ZIMOS/forum/inhaltruss26.html,	p.	92,	accessed	on	22	May	2017.	The	
author	refers	 to	D.	Lowenthal’s	work,	The Past is a Foreign Country,	Cam-
bridge	1985.
52	 It	had	always	been	present	in	the	negative	tradition	due	to	Soviet	propaganda,	
so	it	was	easy	to	simply	reverse	the	signs.	Similarly,	the	return	to	the	tradi-
tion	of	the	Ukrainian	People’s	Republic	has	been	difficult	above	all	because	it	
had	vanished	from	official	propaganda	and	thus	from	public	consciousness	
after	World	War	II.	
53	 One	example	 is	 the	brochure	by	Vita	Levytska,	Stepan Bandera i ya: opo-
vidannia,	Kyiv	2016,	published	as	part	 of	 the	 series	 ‘History	of	Ukraine.	
12	credits’,	aimed	at	facilitating	primary	school	pupils	to	earn	a	maximum	
grade	in	history.	This	text	is	of	a	hagiographic	nature:	Bandera	is	presented	
as	a	relentless	national	resistance	activist	in	the	inter-war	period,	and	also	
a	brave	boy	scout	who	overcame	limitations	linked	to	his	poor	health.	
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of	 the	 decommunisation	 package	 discussed	 above)	 granted	 this	
status	 (amongst	 others)	 to	 all	Ukrainian	military	 organisations	
active	 during	 World	 War	 II	 which	 did	 not	 collaborate	 directly	
with	Nazi	Germany54.	Those	which	did,	such	as	the	Ukrainian	Le-
gion	(of	1939),	the	Nachtigall	and	Roland	battalions	(of	1941),	the	
Ukrainian	Self-Defence	Legion	(of	1943–1944)	and	the	SS	Halychy-
na	(Galizien)	division,	as	well	as	numerous	police	and	guard	for-
mations	were	not	mentioned	in	the	act,	and	thus	their	members	
were	 not	 recognised	 as	 fighters	 for	 independence.	 No	 one	 took	
care	of	the	fact	that	the	same	people	were	often	members	of	both	
(for	example,	a	significant	section	of	those	who	were	UPA	mem-
bers	in	1943–1944	had	received	military	training	in	the	ranks	of	
Nazi	 pacification	 formations,	 known	 as	 Schutzmannschaft).	 It	 is	
also	worth	adding	that	the	act	did	not	grant	veteran	status	to	any-
one,	most	likely	because	most	of	the	organisations	specified	in	it	
were	not	of	a	military	character.	
UPA,	its	leaders	and	ordinary	members	have	ultimately	joined	the	
ranks	 of	Ukraine’s	 national	 heroes,	 even	 though	 it	 is	 suggested	
that	 those	who	 committed	 crimes	 should	 be	 condemned	 or	 ex-
cluded	from	this	group.	This	aspect	of	the	operation	of	Ukrainian	
nationalist	formations	(both	those	who	fought	for	independence	
and	 collaborationist	 formations)	 is,	 however,	when	possible	 left	
unmentioned	 or	 blurred;	 the	 issue	 of	 Ukrainians’	 participation	
in	the	Holocaust	and	the	Nazi	pacifications	of	Belarusian,	Polish	
and	Ukrainian	villages	 is	 passed	 over	 in	 silence,	while	 the	Vol-
hynia	Massacre	 is	 presented	 as	 either	 a	 ‘conflict	with	 Poles’	 or	
54	 This	is	their	full	list:	Organisation	of	Ukrainian	Nationalists,	People’s	Libera-
tion	Revolutionary	Organisation	(a	little-known	organisation	established	by	
UPA	leaders	in	Volhynia	in	summer	1944),	the	Ukrainian	Insurgent	Army,	
the	Ukrainian	Insurgent	Army	of	Ataman	Taras	Borovets	(also	known	as	
Poliska	Sich	and	the	Ukrainian	Liberation	Army),	the	Ukrainian	Supreme	
Liberation	Council	(a	political	agency	established	by	the	leaders	of	OUN-UPA	
at	the	beginning	of	1945)	and	the	Anti-Bolshevik	Bloc	of	Nations	(a	coalition	
of	anti-Soviet	organisations	of	various	nations	established	under	the	aegis	
of	OUN-UPA).
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‘the	Second	Polish-Ukrainian	War’55,	and	the	crimes	committed	at	
that	time	are	treated	as	an	element	of	‘jacquerie’,	the	uncontrolled	
peasant	movement56	or	as	‘symmetrical’	to	the	Polish	crimes	com-
mitted	against	the	Ukrainian	civilian	population.	Sometimes	the	
developments	of	those	times	are	presented	as	a	conflict	between	
two	groups	of	citizens	of	 the	Republic	of	Poland	which	does	not	
concern	modern	Ukraine,	etc.,	more	often	the	question	 is	asked	
who	began	the	spiral	of	the	crimes	and	why	it	was	the	Poles.	
The	essence	of	 the	 thesis	of	 the	 ‘Second	War’	places	 the	UPA	on	
the	same	platform	as	the	Pol	ishHome	Army	(as	regards	both	the	
status	of	the	organisations	and	the	methods	of	their	operation	and	
their	consequences)57,	and	thus	putting	the	state	structures	creat-
ed	by	OUN-UPA	in	1943	and	the	Polish	Underground	State	on	a	par	
(for	the	time	being	this	is	merely	implied	but	will	soon	probably	
be	expressed	openly).	At	the	same	time,	the	UPA	is	presented	to	an	
increasing	extent	as	an	anti-Nazi	force	and	an	objective	ally	of	the	
Western	powers.	For	the	time	being,	this	is	taking	place	mainly	in	
publications	and	media	statements.	
55	 This	thesis	was	formulated	for	the	first	time	by	Viatrovych	in	his	work	Druha 
polsko-ukrayinska viyna 1942–1947,	Kyiv	2011.	It	has	become	generally	accepted	
also	among	authors	whose	views	are	far	from	nationalist.	
56	 The	pogroms	of	the	Jewish	population	in	1917–1920	are	presented	by	UINP	
in	a	 similar	manner	–	and	much	more	 in	compliance	with	 the	 facts	–	as	
‘jacquerie’	in	an	attempt	to	limit	(if	not	exclude)	the	responsibility	of	the	
UNP’s	leaders	for	them.	Cf.	Desyat’ mifiv pro ukrayinsku revolutsiyu,	http://
www/memory/gov.ua/desjat-mifiv-pro-ukrajinsku-revolyutsiju	accessed	on	
16	March	2017.	
57	 Viatrovych	even	writes	about	“the	Polish	underground	and	its	paramilitary	
structures	(especially	the	Home	Army)”	and	“the	Ukrainian	underground	
and	the	Ukrainian	Insurgent	Army”	as	parties	to	the	conflict.	(Volodymyr	
Viatrovych,	‘Polsko-ukrayinski	vidnosyny	v	1940-x.	Propozytsiya	istorych-
noi	dyskusii’	[in]	Vina dvokh pravd,	op. cit.,	p.	266).
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V. The shadow of The holocausT
The	Soviet	narrative	of	World	War	 II	 remembrance	avoided	dif-
ferentiating	its	victims	along	national	or	religious	lines.	This	was	
not,	 as	 is	usually	 thought,	 a	 result	 of	 the	desire	 to	 conceal	 Jew-
ish	 (or	Polish	 and	others)	 victims	but	was	 rather	 an	 element	of	
building	a	 supra-ethnic	and	non-religious	Soviet	nation.	This	 is	
the	reason	why	inscriptions	honouring	‘Soviet	people’	or	citizens	
of	the	Soviet	Union	were	placed	on	monuments	commemorating	
the	victims	of	 the	 then	events	 (including	the	Holocaust	and	the	
Volhynia	Massacre).	
When	after	1991	Ukraine	became	confronted	with	Poland’s	expec-
tations	that	citizens	of	the	Republic	of	Poland	who	had	been	killed	
in	its	territory	should	be	honoured	separately,	the	slogan	‘victims	
should	not	be	divided’	was	coined	and	was	used,	for	example,	to	
block	the	construction	of	a	Polish	cemetery	in	Bykivnia.	This	con-
viction	was	strengthened	by	the	fact	that	the	Communist	terror	
had	relatively	rarely	employed	the	ethnic	criterion	and	that	eth-
nic	Ukrainians,	Russians,	Jews,	Poles	and	the	less	numerous	rep-
resentatives	of	many	other	nations	are	buried	in	the	mass	graves	
of	the	victims	of	the	Great	Purge58.	This	is	exactly	the	same	as	with	
the	mass	graves	of	those	killed	during	World	War	II.	Over	the	past	
few	years,	 this	way	of	 thinking	has	fitted	 in	with	 the	 tendency	
of	strengthening	the	civic	nature	of	the	Ukrainian	national	com-
munity	where	it	does	not	matter	who	is	an	ethnic	Ukrainian,	Rus-
sian,	 Jew	or	Pole,	 if	 all	of	 them	fight	and	die	 in	defence	of	 their	
common	fatherland.	
It	seems	that	Kyiv	does	not	notice	or	does	not	understand	the	sig-
nificance	of	the	memory	of	the	Holocaust,	including	the	demand	
to	commemorate	Jews	precisely	as	Jews	in	the	political	discourse	
58	 Representatives	of	numerous	ethnic	groups,	including	very	numerous	Poles	
being	Soviet	citizens,	rest	next	to	each	other	(with	the	exception	of	the	sepa-
rate	section	where	Polish	officers	killed	in	1940	are	buried)	in	the	Bykivnia	
Graves.	
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that	is	currently	predominant	in	Europe	and	the	USA.	This	has	an	
impact	on	how	their	attitude	towards	Ukraine	is	shaped	(in	turn,	
Russia	understands	 this	perfectly).	Ukraine	and	 its	most	 senior	
authorities	were	completely	unprepared	for	confronting	this	dis-
course.	 President	 Poroshenko’s	 apology	 for	 the	 participation	 of	
“some	Ukrainians”	 in	 the	Holocaust	during	his	visit	 to	 Israel	 in	
December	 2015	did	not	 change	much	 in	 this	 area	 –	 they	passed	
almost	unnoticed	in	Ukraine.	It	seems	that	even	the	presidential	
administration	was	not	interested	in	promoting	this	event	on	the	
domestic	arena	because	it	did	not	fit	in	with	the	predominant	and	
increasingly	stronger	perception	of	Ukrainians	as	a	nation	of	vic-
tims	and	heroes.	
The	speech	the	president	of	Israel,	Reuven	Rivlin,	gave	at	the	Verk-
hovna	Rada	in	September	2016	was	groundbreaking.	He	stated	di-
rectly	that	many	Ukrainians	collaborated	with	the	Nazis	during	
the	Holocaust	in	Ukraine,	pointing,	in	particular,	to	members	of	
OUN.	This	met	with	 resistance	 in	Ukraine,	which	disheartened	
Ukrainians	instead	of	motivating	them	to	start	a	serious	discus-
sion	on	the	scale	of	Ukrainian	participation	in	the	Holocaust59	and	
the	 legacy	 of	Ukrainian	 anti-Semitism	and	 its	 present	 shape.	 It	
seems	unlikely	that	such	a	discussion	could	be	started	in	a	situa-
tion	when	even	in	the	opinion	of	moderate	Ukrainian	historians	
and	publicists,	the	voices	of	European	critics	are	in	unison	with	
Moscow’s	 anti-Ukrainian	 propaganda,	 even	 if	 this	 similarity	 is	
accidental60.	
Two	more	 elements	 obstruct	 Ukrainian	 reflection	 on	 the	Holo-
caust.	The	first	one	is	the	desire	and	endeavour	to	perceive	their	
own	 nation	 only	 in	 terms	 of	 victimhood	 and	 not	 allowing	 the	
thought	 that	 ‘we’	 could	 have	 committed	 crimes.	This	 problem,	
59	 It	is	indisputable	that	Ukrainians,	who	were	both	Polish	and	Soviet	citizens	
before	the	war,	took	part	in	this	crime,	but	their	participation	has	still	not	
been	researched	in	a	sufficiently	detailed	manner.	
60	 Cf.	Riabchuk’s	opinion	quoted	above	(footnote	50).	
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which	has	also	been	present	in	Polish	disputes,	does	not	require	
much	comment.	Another	one	is	the	endeavour	initiated	by	Presi-
dent	Viktor	Yushchenko	 to	present	 the	Holodomor61	not	only	as	
genocide	against	the	Ukrainian	nation	but	as	a	crime,	comparable	
to	the	Holocaust.	This	rhetoric	was	discontinued	during	Yanuko-
vych’s	presidency,	but	it	returned	with	renewed	vigour	after	2014.	
In	May	2017,	Prime	Minister	Volodymyr	Groysman	(by	the	way,	
a	Jew	who	publicly	declares	his	identity)	on	his	official	visit	to	Is-
rael	appealed	once	again	to	the	Knesset	to	recognise	the	Holodo-
mor	as	genocide.	This	demand	is	difficult	for	Israel	to	accept.	
61	 A	famine	which	affected	the	Ukrainian	part	of	the	Soviet	Union	in	1932–33,	
at	least	partly	stimulated	by	the	Soviet	government	(in	Kyiv’s	opinion,	it	was	
intended	and	planned	by	the	central	government).	Most	likely,	the	death	toll	
was	around	3.5	million	people.	The	term	Holodomor	does	not	cover	famines	
of	the	same	period	which	affected	territories	of	the	Soviet	Union	other	than	
the	lands	inhabited	by	ethnic	Ukrainians.	
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VI. The (forGoTTen) memory 
of The VolhynIa massacre 
The	Polish-Ukrainian	remembrance	conflict	over	the	operation	of	
the	UPA	and,	more	precisely,	the	recognition	of	the	mass	murders	
of	the	Polish	population	in	Volhynia	and	Eastern	Galicia	as	an	act	
of	genocide,	has	been	severely	escalated	in	effect	of	the	processes	
taking	place	 in	both	 countries.	There	 is	no	doubt	 that	 for	UINP	
and	the	circles	supporting	it	the	memory	of	the	Volhynia	Massa-
cre	is	inconvenient	and	they	would	rather	freeze	any	discussions	
concerning	 this	 issue.	 However,	 they	 have	 to	 tackle	 this	 issue,	
given	the	growing	interest	it	is	provoking	in	Poland	(also	among	
researchers	and	politicians).	However	(unlike,	for	example,	with	
decommunisation)	their	actions	in	this	area	are	no	more	than	re-
sponsive;	 they	do	not	try	to	take	any	action	until	Warsaw	takes	
steps.	The	methods	of	downplaying	or	denying	the	UPA’s	crimes	
have	been	briefly	outlined	in	section	III.	
Kyiv	(and	this	opinion	is	prevalent	among	the	Ukrainian	political	
class)	does	not	agree	to	recognising	the	Volhynia	Massacre	as	an	
act	of	genocide,	employing	a	variety	of	arguments62,	mainly	those	
focused	on	the	assumption	that	a	party	engaged	in	a	struggle	for	
national	liberation	cannot	commit	such	a	crime	(or,	perhaps,	any	
crime),	even	if	it	takes	action	with	regard	to	‘an	invader’	civilian	
population,	and	also	that	the	term	‘genocide’	can	only	be	used,	if	
a	competent	international	court	has	ruled	that	this	status	should	
be	granted	to	a	given	event.	The	fact	that	this	term	was	used	in	the	
resolutions	of	the	Polish	parliament	met	with	particular	criticism	
in	201663.	The	latter	seems	to	be	an	essential	point	of	the	allega-
62	 An	overview	of	this	argumentation	can	be	found	in:	Andriy	Kozitskiy,	‘Volyn:	
nevdala	sproba	‘ostatochnoho	rozvyazannia’	naukovoi	problemy’	[in]	Viyna 
dvokh pravd,	op. cit.,	pp.	142–151.	
63	 On	the	other	hand,	this	does	not	prevent	Ukraine	from	claiming	that	the	
Holodomor	was	an	act	of	genocide	committed	against	the	Ukrainian	nation	
and	convincing	the	parliaments	of	more	and	more	countries	to	officially	rec-
ognise	this	fact.	
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tions	that	 the	Polish	side	 is	 ‘politicising’	an	 issue	that	should	be	
left	to	historians	alone64.
A	new	tendency	in	interpreting	the	events	of	1943–1944	has	been	
noticed	over	the	past	two	years:	questioning	the	reliability	of	So-
viet	sources	concerning	UPA	crimes	(especially	records	of	inter-
rogation	of	UPA	members).	Without	going	into	the	details	of	these	
strictly	academic	polemics,	it	is	difficult	not	to	notice	another	‘ma-
noeuvre’	in	this	tendency	which	appeals	to	the	Ukrainian	public	
even	more	strongly	since	it	fits	in	with	the	broader	trend	of	the	
de-Sovietisation	of	Ukrainian	historical	memory.	
UINP	has	suggested	a	formula	of	reconciliation	based	on	a	strict	sym-
metry	of	both	actions	and	evaluations;	Poland	and	Ukraine	should	
jointly	 honour	 the	 victims	 of	 the	 conflict,	 jointly	 condemn	 those	
who	committed	crimes	and	create	a	common	platform	for	dialogue	
between	historians,	publish	a	 joint	presidential	Declaration	of	Re-
membrance	 and	 Reconciliation,	 jointly	 set	 a	 day	 of	 remembrance	
of	the	victims	of	the	conflict	and	together	erect	a	monument	to	the	
victims	 with	 the	 inscription	 ‘Mutual	 hatred	 was	 buried	 here’65.	
The	list	presented	above	contains	one	more	element	that	deserves	
separate	attention:	in	Zinchenko’s	opinion	it	is	necessary	“to	mu-
tually	admit	that	‘all	victims	of	the	conflict	are	ours,	not	Ukrain-
ian	or	Polish,	but	human’”66.	These	words	are	a	clear	reference	not	
64	 The	 latter	demand	also	has	another	point:	Viatrovych	and	his	associates	
would	like	to	remove	Ukrainian	politicians	from	remembrance	policy	and	
turn	it	into	their	own	monopoly.	
65	 Zinchenko,	op. cit.,	pp.	297–298.	According	to	this	author,	one	of	Viatrovych’s	
closest	aides,	this	is	a	summary	of	the	concept	presented	by	UINP	in	2014	to	
the	government	of	Ukraine.
66	 Zinchenko,	op. cit.,	p.	297.	The	source	of	the	internal	quotation	is	not	speci-
fied.	Cf.	also	another	Zinchenko’s	statement:	“becoming	aware	of	the	fact	
that	all	victims	are	ours	can	be	a	formula	of	reconciliation.	Not	Polish,	not	
Ukrainian	–	human;	we	must	jointly	condemn	this	and	bury	mutual	hatred”,	
http://hromadskeradio.org/programs/rankova-hvylya/wyznannya-podiy-
na-volyni-genocydom-pogirshyt-vidnosyny-ukrayiny-i-polshchi-istoryk	
accessed	on	17	June	2017.	
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only	to	Christian	humanism	but	also	to	the	aforementioned	Soviet	
concept	of	‘not	dividing	the	victims’.	The	author	deliberately	dis-
regards	here	the	fact	that	the	present	dispute	over	the	events	that	
took	place	in	Volhynia	and	Eastern	Galicia	in	1943–1945	concerns	
the	attitude	 towards	 the	perpetrators	 (especially	 the	UPA	as	an	
organisation)	and	not	the	victims.	
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VII. one hundred years of IndePendence, 
one hundred years of war
Independent	 Ukraine	 has	 not	 decided	 as	 yet	 to	 formally	 draw	
upon	the	tradition	of	the	Ukrainian	People’s	Republic	(UNR)	that	
was	proclaimed	in	1917	and	was	ultimately	destroyed	by	Bolshe-
vik	Russia	three	years	later.	The	fact	that	Mykola	Plaviuk,	the	last	
president	of	 the	UNR	in	exile,	handed	over	the	Republic’s	 insig-
nia	 to	 the	 president	 of	 Ukraine	 in	 1992	was	 disregarded	 by	 the	
Ukrainian	 state,	 and	 the	 constitution	mentions	 only	 in	 general	
terms	 “centuries	 of	 tradition	 of	 the	 operation	 of	 the	Ukrainian	
state.”	The	Ukrainian	Independent	[and]	United	State	proclaimed	
by	Bandera’s	OUN67	 (which	did	not	become	a	political	 reality)	 is	
mentioned	much	more	frequently	than	the	UNR	in	popular	his-
torical	rhetoric.	
UINP	has	suggested	adding	a	preamble	to	the	governmental	draft	
Act	 on	 the	Participants	 of	 the	 Struggle	 for	Ukraine’s	 Independ-
ence	of	9	April68	2015	which	states,	amongst	other	things,	the	fol-
lowing,	“considering	the	fact	that	the	Central	Council	of	Ukraine	
on	 9	(20)	November	 1917,	 under	 its	Third	Universal,	 proclaimed	
the	Ukrainian	People’s	Republic,	and	on	9	(22)	January	1918,	un-
der	the	Fourth	Universal,	the	Ukrainian	People’s	Republic	was	an-
nounced	as	a	self-reliant,	independent,	free	and	sovereign	state	of	
the	Ukrainian	Nation	(…)	emphasising	the	fact	that	on	8	(21)	De-
cember	 1917	Soviet	 Russia	 launched	military	 aggression	 against	
the	Ukrainian	People’s	Republic	which	led	to	the	occupation	and	
later	annexation	of	Ukrainian	territory	(…),	considering	the	ex-
istence	of	the	government	and	other	state	bodies	of	the	Ukrainian	
People’s	Republic	in	exile	after	the	occupation	and	annexation	of	
67	 Few	people,	even	in	Ukraine,	pay	attention	to	the	fact	that	this	act	was	in	
the	form	of	restitution	and	not	proclamation	of	independence.	Therefore,	
even	though	the	new	name	was	introduced,	it	also	drew	upon	the	tradition	
of	the	UNR.
68	 The	text	is	available	on:	http://search.ligazakon.ua/l_doc2.nsf/link1/JH1Y-
I00A.html,	accessed	on	2	June	2017.
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
9/
20
17
42
Ukrainian	territory	 in	1920–1992	and	the	fact	 that	on	22	August	
1992,	 the	 President	 of	 the	Ukrainian	 People’s	 Republic	 in	 exile,	
Mykola	Plaviuk,	submitted	an	official	 letter	from	the	UNR	State	
Centre	to	the	President	of	Ukraine	stating	that	the	Ukrainian	State	
proclaimed	on	24	August	and	approved	by	the	people	of	Ukraine	
on	1	December	1991	is	the	continuator	of	the	state-national	tradi-
tions	and	 the	 legal	 successor	of	 the	Ukrainian	People’s	Republic	
(…).	This	Act	determines	the	legal	status	of	the	participants	of	the	
struggle	for	Ukraine’s	independence	in	the	20th	century”.	
It	is	written	further	in	article	3.2	of	the	draft	that,	“The	state	recog-
nises	the	struggle	for	Ukraine’s	independence	in	the	20th	century	
as	legal69	because	its	goals,	forms	and	methods	did	not	contradict	
the	UN	Charter,	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	and	
other	international	acts	of	law.”	It	finally	states	in	article	7.2	that	
“individuals	guilty	of	violating	this	act	shall	face	liability	envis-
aged	by	 the	 law,”	which	was	merely	a	declaration	devoid	of	any	
legal	meaning70.	
Presenting	the	matter	this	way	was	a	symbolic	breakthrough	that	
rooted	modern	Ukraine	in	history	and	made	its	right	to	independ-
ence	(in	fragments	which	have	been	skipped	here)	based	not	on	
the	 generally	 understood	 right	 of	 nations	 to	 self-determination	
(as	 is	provided	 in	 the	constitution)	but	on	specific	acts	of	 inter-
national	 law.	The	 argumentation	 for	 the	 struggle	 for	 Ukraine’s	
independence	to	be	recognised	as	legal	(complying	with	a	law	of	
nations)	was	selected	well,	and	the	norms	were	correctly	estab-
lished	on	its	grounds	from	the	formal	viewpoint.	
For	 reasons	 that	 are	not	quite	known,	probably	under	pressure	
from	the	Ukrainian	president’s	inner	circle,	a	day	before	the	vote,	
69	 The	word	‘pravomirnost’	used	in	the	Ukrainian	text	is	a	strict	equivalent	of	
‘legality’	as	a	legal	term.	
70	 Imposing	real	liability	would	require	determining	the	kind	of	liability	(crim-
inal,	administrative,	civilian)	and	precise	acts	recognised	as	‘violations	of	
the	act.’	
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the	draft	was	replaced	with	a	new	one,	a	hastily	written	modifica-
tion	of	the	previous	one.	It	was	announced	that	it	was	no	longer	
a	governmental	but	 a	parliamentary	draft71.	The	new	preamble,	
significantly	shorter,	was	stripped	of	any	political	meaning.	The	
provision	 concerning	 the	 legality	 of	 the	 struggle	 for	 independ-
ence	was	put	as	follows	(article	2.2):	“The	legal	ground	for	grant-
ing	legal	status	to	those	who	fought	for	Ukraine’s	independence	in	
the	20th	century	are	international	acts	and	national	legislation	of	
Ukraine	pursuant	to	which	the	state	recognises	as	legal	the	forms	
and	methods	of	struggle	for	the	independence	of	Ukraine	in	the	
20th	 century”	 (and	 thus	 that	 the	 struggle	 for	 independence	was	
legal	 because	 the	modern	Ukrainian	 state	 deems	 it	 so).	 Finally,	
the	penal	provision	(article	6)	was	significantly	expanded	and	re-
ceived	the	 following	wording:	“6.1:	Citizens	of	Ukraine,	 foreign-
ers	and	stateless	persons	who	demonstrate	a	contemptuous	atti-
tude	 in	public	 towards	the	 individuals	referred	to	 in	article	1	of	
this	act,	impede	the	exercise	of	the	rights	of	those	who	fought	for	
Ukraine’s	independence	in	the	20th	century	and	shall	be	held	li-
able	in	compliance	with	Ukrainian	legislation	currently	in	force.	
6.2	Public	denial	of	the	legality	of	struggle	for	the	independence	
of	Ukraine	 in	 the	 20th	 century	 shall	 be	 deemed	 as	 deriding	 the	
memory	of	 those	who	 fought	 for	Ukraine’s	 independence	 in	 the	
20th	century	and	degrading	the	dignity	of	the	Ukrainian	Nation,	
and	is	illegal”72.
The	 initial	 coherent	 draft	has	 been	 completely	wasted.	 Reading	
the	adopted	text	of	the	act,	it	is	impossible	to	understand	what	the	
legality	of	 the	struggle	 for	Ukraine’s	 independence	results	 from	
or	even	what	it	is.	The	wording	of	the	penal	regulation	has	been	
elaborated	in	a	grossly	imprecise	manner	and	means	that	it	can	be	
71	 Formally,	it	was	put	forward	by	Yuri	Shukhevych,	a	member	of	Oleh	Lyashko’s	
Radical	Party	faction,	a	son	of	the	UPA	commander,	Roman	Shukhevych.	
However,	it	is	obvious	that	Shukhevych	was	not	the	author	of	this	document.	
72	 All	 quotations	 originate	 from	 the	 official	 text	 of	 the	 act	 as	 in	 http://za-
kon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/314–19/print1301001262798510,	 accessed	 on	
19	May	2015.
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understood	as	an	introduction	to	restricting	the	freedom	of	aca-
demic	publications,	which	has	provoked	serious	criticism73.	The	
overriding	goal	of	the	act	–	to	formally	link	Ukraine’s	‘new’	inde-
pendence	with	the	‘old’	one	–	has	been	missed	completely.	In	this	
case	Viatrovych	sustained	a	painful	defeat.	
However,	 UINP	 has	 not	 given	 up	 on	 restoring	 the	 20th	 century	
state	 tradition	 in	 Ukraine.	 The	 one	 hundredth	 anniversary	 of	
these	 events	 served	 as	 an	 occasion	 for	 this.	 In	March	 2017,	 the	
Ukrainian	 government	 approved	 the	 Action	 Plan	 prepared	 by	
UINP	in	connection	with	the	celebration	of	the	one	hundredth	an-
niversary	of	the	Ukrainian	National	Revolution	of	1919–192174.	The	
celebration	plan	is	focused	on	the	state-building	process	and	mili-
tary	actions;	there	is	no	place	for	it	for	the	insurgent	movement	
led	by	Nestor	Makhno75	or	actions	taken	by	other	‘atamans’76,	or	
for	the	overthrow	of	the	Republic	by	Hetman	Skoropadskyi	and	
its	restitution	as	a	result	of	people’s	uprising.	There	is	no	place	in	it	
for	the	Polish-Ukrainian	alliance	of	1920.	A	list	of	the	anniversa-
ries	taken	into	account	in	the	plan	and	a	list	of	the	most	important	
events	skipped	in	it	are	provided	in	the	Appendix.	
73	 It	was	only	in	January	2017	that	a	draft	appeared	proposing	introducing	to	the	
Criminal	Code	of	Ukraine	the	crimes	of	publicly	negating	the	legality	of	the	
struggle	for	Ukraine’s	independence	in	the	20th	century	and	of	publicly	ne-
gating	the	Holodomor.	However,	not	even	attempts	to	put	this	on	the	agenda	
have	been	made	as	yet.	
74	 www.memory.gov.ua/news/uryad-zatverdiv-plan-zakhodiv-z-vidznachennya-
100-richchya-podii-ukrainskoi-revolyutsii-1917–19,	accessed	on	6	March	2017.
75	 Nestor	Makhno	 created	 a	 powerful	 army	 in	 southern	Ukraine	 in	 1918–
1920	which	did	not	report	to	any	state	agency.	He	would	temporarily	co-
operate	with	the	forces	of	UNR	and	Bolsheviks,	to	be	finally	defeated	by	the	
latter.	
76	 Local	leaders	of	guerrilla	troops,	some	of	which	had	several	thousand	or	even	
more	than	ten	thousand	soldiers,	who	backed	UNR	in	the	struggle	against	
the	hetman	towards	the	end	of	1918	but	who	later	turned	against	it.	Localness	
(focusing	on	defending	the	immediate	neighbourhood)	and	an	unwillingness	
to	join	the	ranks	of	a	regular	army	were	among	the	characteristics	of	the	
ataman	movement.	
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The	fact	that	the	term	‘Ukrainian	revolution’	has	come	into	official	
use	is	of	key	significance	in	itself.	From	circa	1991,	only	a	group	of	
historians	used	it,	including	Orest	Subtelny77,	who	is	very	influ-
ential	in	Ukraine,	and	it	also	appeared	in	some	textbooks.	How-
ever,	the	predominant	trend	was	to	treat	these	events	–	in	com-
pliance	with	 the	Soviet	and	Russian	historiography	–	as	part	of	
the	all-Russian	revolution	and	civil	war,	and	thus	a	derivative	of	
the	 processes	 which	were	 centred	 on	Moscow	 and	 Petrograd78.	
At	 present,	 the	Ukrainian	 struggle	 for	 independence	 is	 becom-
ing	an	autonomous	event/process,	the	developments	in	Russia	are	
treated	as	external,	and	the	operations	of	Russian	troops,	be	they	
Bolshevik	or	White	Guard	forces,	in	Ukraine	are	viewed	as	foreign	
invasions.	
The	 celebrations	 include	 numerous	 planned	 academic	 confer-
ences	 and	 publications	 and	will	most	 likely	 provoke	 numerous	
discussions	 and	 disputes79	 that	will	 be	meaningful	 not	 only	 for	
historical	 consciousness	 but	 also	 for	 the	 modern	 reflection	 on	
state	and	nation.	The	Ukrainian	People’s	Republic	was	a	Socialist	
(but	not	Bolshevik)	entity,	and	it	was	only	the	Bolshevik	invasion	
that	forced	it	to	take	a	pro-independence	stance;	a	well-governed	
and	efficient	Ukrainian	state	was	created	(although	for	only	a	few	
months	 and	under	German	occupation)	 by	Pavlo	 Skoropadskyi,	
77	 Cf.	Orest	Subtelny,	Ukrayina. Istoriya,	Kyiv	1991,	p.	310.	For	more	details	on	
the	role	played	by	this	work	in	the	shaping	of	the	historical	narrative	of	in-
dependent	Ukraine	see:	Tadeusz	A.	Olszański,	Miejsce UPA w Wielkiej Wojnie 
Ojczyźnianej…,	op. cit.,	p.	17.	
78	 The	grounds	 for	 treating	 the	 then	developments	as	 a	 revolution	and	not	
merely	a	struggle	for	national	liberation,	as	well	as	for	the	distinctness	of	
the	Ukrainian	and	Russian	revolutionary	processes	can	be	found	in:	Jarosław	
Hrycak,	Historia Ukrainy 1772–1999. Narodziny nowoczesnego narodu,	Lublin	
2000,	pp.	115–118.	
79	 It	seems	that	the	UINP’s	publication	is	a	foretaste	for	these:	Ten myths of the 
Ukrainian Revolution,	www.memory.gov.ua/news/desyat-mifiv-pro-ukrain-
sku-revolyutsiu,	accessed	on	16	March	2017;	as	are	the	articles	published	in	
Holos Ukrayiny,	the	official	newspaper	of	Ukrainian	parliament,	on	28	Janu-
ary	2017,	pp.	4–5.	Cf.	also	the	article	by	Yulia	Oliynyk,	Ostatochno prokynuty-
sia,	in:	http://tyzhden.ua/Society/164034,	accessed	on	5 January	2017.
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a	conservative	aristocrat	and,	independently	of	him,	by	Ukrain-
ian	 National	 Democrats	 from	 Eastern	 Galicia.	 The	 hero	 of	 the	
anti-Bolshevik	offensive	of	1918	and	probably	the	most	skilful	of	
the	Ukrainian	commanders	of	 the	epoch,	Petro	Bolbochan,	was	
executed	in	1919	on	Symon	Petliura’s	order	for	excessive	political	
and	military	self-reliance.	There	are	many	controversial	episodes	
like	this.	Judging	from	the	materials	published	so	far,	UINP	is	try-
ing	to	unite	these	traditions	and	blur	the	conflicts	and	controver-
sies.	How	successful	will	it	be?	
The	commemorations	of	the	one	hundred	years	of	the	struggle	for	
independence	are	also	meaningful	 in	current	politics;	Ukraine	 is	
again	at	war	with	Russia.	One	may	wonder	whether,	if	not	for	the	
war,	the	accents	would	have	been	distributed	similarly	or	not	in	the	
celebration	programme.	Hushing	up	the	memory	of	Makhno	and	
other	atamans	and	accentuating	the	operations	of	the	regular	army	
obviously	served	the	current	political	goals;	political	and	military	
lawlessness	is	still	a	threat	to	the	state.	It	is	not	a	coincidence	that,	
when	criticising	the	lawless	blockades	of	railway	connections	with	
Donbas,	 President	 Poroshenko	 branded	 them	 as	 ‘ataman-like’	 in	
a	clearly	negative	meaning.	A	similarly	contemporary	context	can	
be	found	in	the	words	of	Parliamentary	Speaker	Andriy	Parubiy	on	
his	opening	speech	on	the	occasion	of	the	official	celebration	of	the	
one	hundredth	anniversary	of	the	revolution:	“In	March	1917,	along	
with	Ukrainian	parliamentarism,	the	Ukrainian	army	was	reviv-
ing.	The	army	which	was	and	is	a	foundation	of	the	Ukrainian	state.	
(…)	The	Ukrainian	soldier	was	the	only	ally	to	have	never	betrayed	
his	own	nation,	to	have	never	betrayed	Ukraine80.	
During	the	same	ceremonial	session	of	Ukrainian	parliament	on	
17	March	2017,	Viatrovych,	who	was	invited	to	take	the	floor,	not	
only	returned	to	restoring	the	‘state-building	legacy’	of	the	UNR	
to	Ukraine	but	also	stated,	“Our	century-long	war	for	freedom	is	
80	 www.rada.gov.ua/print/141729.html,	accessed	on	21	March	2017.	
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not	over	yet”81.	Ten	days	 later,	Parubiy	began	his	 speech	on	 the	
occasion	of	the	anniversary	of	the	Battle	of	Kruty	as	follows:	“The	
war	with	Ukraine’s	perennial	enemy,	Russia,	has	been	underway	
already	for	one	hundred	years	almost	without	interruption”82.	In	
statements	that	followed,	various	authors	backed	this	thesis,	for	
example,	by	extending	the	notion	of	hybrid	war	so	that	 it	could	
also	cover	the	Holodomor.	
This	project	is	planned	to	continue	for	almost	five	years83.	If	it	is	
carried	through,	it	may	bring	serious	changes	in	Ukrainians’	his-
torical	and	civic	consciousness.	The	emphasis	on	the	UNR	tradi-
tion	free	of	ethnic	nationalism	will	contribute	to	building	a	new,	
civic	and	democratic	Ukrainian	nationalism,	and	also	a	new	ar-
chetype	of	struggle	for	one’s	own	state,	offering	an	alternative	to	
the	currently	predominant	UPA	tradition	and	providing	a	chance	
to	choose	one	of	the	variants	of	the	unambiguously	patriotic	tra-
dition.	This	will	allow	the	tradition	of	the	national	state	to	be	ex-
panded	to	those	circles	to	whom	the	UPA	tradition	is	and	will	re-
main	difficult	and	even	impossible	to	accept.	
A	return	to	the	various	threads	of	previous	controversies	will	also	
broaden	the	field	of	political	discourse	which	is	extremely	limited	
at	present;	it	will	offer	a	chance	for	Ukrainian	conservative	group-
ings	to	become	stronger	(drawing	upon	the	tradition	of	Hetman	
Skoropadskyi)	 and	 a	 revival	 of	 the	Ukrainian	 social	 left	 (draw-
ing	 upon	 the	 pro-independence	 traditions	 of	 Socialist	 parties).	
If	it	becomes	possible	to	establish	a	formal	link	between	modern	
Ukraine	and	 the	Ukrainian	People’s	Republic	 and	 its	 continuity	
81	 The	text	of	this	speech	can	be	found	on	the	author’s	blog	http://blogs.pravda.
com.ua/authors/viatrovych/58cbde2177a8d/,	accessed	on	2	March	2017.	
82	 Holos Ukrayiny,	28	January	2017,	p.	1.	
83	 One	of	its	elements	will	be	the	rehabilitation	of	the	participants	of	the	fights	
for	liberation	in	1917–1921,	i.e.	repealing	the	sentences	imposed	on	them	by	
Soviet	courts;	this	is	a	purely	symbolic	act	after	one	hundred	years.	Attorney	
General	Yuri	Lutsenko	in	January	2017	promised	that	an	act	regulating	these	
issues	would	be	passed.	
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is	 cherished	 by	 the	 supreme	 state	 authorities	 and	 diplomacy84,	
Ukraine	will	 reinforce	 its	position	on	 the	 ‘symbolic’	map	of	 the	
world	gaining	the	standing	of	a	state	that	has	a	tradition	longer	
than	the	merely	post-Soviet.	
84	 Ukraine’s	independence	in	1918–1919	was	officially	recognised	by	24	coun-
tries,	and	unofficially	by	five	more.	
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conclusIon
Ukraine’s	 remembrance	 policy	 and	 also	 its	 historical	 memory	
(not	 only	 in	 connection	with	 this	 policy)	 is	 undergoing	 a	 great	
transformation.	The	war	has	revalorised	numerous	thought	pat-
terns,	 numerous	 hierarchies.	 Increasingly	more	 is	 being	 heard	
from	pro-Western	but	non-liberal	circles	who	share	the	concepts	
of	the	nation,	state	and	history	rooted	in	the	first	half	of	the	20th	
century	but	which	have	been	given	up	in	the	West.	More	is	also	
being	heard	from	the	new	generation	formed	in	an	independent	
Ukraine,	to	whom	World	War	II	is	already	history	but	for	whom	
the	ongoing	war	with	Russia	is	a	profound,	formative	experience	
(also	to	those	who	take	no	direct	part	in	it).	
Ukraine	 is	not	a	 ‘lonely	 island’;	 the	changes	 taking	place	across	
the	modern	world	 also	 affect	 it.	 In	 turn,	 identity	 policy	 is	 cur-
rently	undergoing	 great	 changes	 linked	 to	 its	new	 socialisation	
(or	 democratisation)	 resulting	 from	 new	 information	 sharing	
technologies.	The	increasingly	strong	role	played	by	social	media	
segmenting	the	discourse	(that	help	exchange	opinions	not	only	
within	 a	 circle	 of	 those	with	 a	 similar	mindset),	 Twitter	which	
forces	 its	users	 to	 formulate	 their	 thoughts	 in	a	very	brief	 form	
and	 thus	 radically,	without	 going	 into	 any	nuances	 or	 explana-
tions,	 the	 Internet	memes	 combining	 the	 serious	message	with	
the	satirical,	 less	and	less	time	left	to	respond	(discussions	even	
under	serious	articles	published	on	blogs	rarely	last	longer	than	
ten	or	so	hours)	all	impede	a	serious	exchange	of	thought.	On	the	
other	hand,	the	new	opportunities	mean	that	many	more	people	
are	participating	in	public	discussions	than	as	recently	as	twenty	
years	ago,	and	thus	views	which	used	to	remain	within	the	pri-
vate	space	are	now	articulated	in	public.	
The	advantage	of	the	Internet	media	over	the	‘classical’	media	has	
also	brought	about	‘post-truth’,	a	lie	which	is	easily	spread	and	dif-
ficult	to	spot.	 In	the	initial	phase	of	the	Donbas	war,	 it	was	em-
ployed	on	a	great	scale	above	all	–	though	not	exclusively	–	against	
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Ukraine	and	its	external	allies.	Manipulating	public	discourse	is	
now	easier,	and	it	is	increasingly	difficult	–	for	ordinary	audiences	
it	is	practically	impossible	–	to	unmask	this	manipulation,	and	es-
pecially	 to	distinguish	what	 is	a	 spontaneously	 formed,	earnest	
(though	 erroneous)	 opinion	 and	 what	 is	 a	 well-thought-out	 lie	
aimed	at	derailing	the	discussion.	This	 is	being	used	by	various	
centres	of	 influence	 interested	 in	pushing	public	discussions	 in	
the	directions	desirable	to	them.	
This	has	a	special	meaning	for	historical	policy	because	its	threads	
are	usually	 commonly	 familiar	 and	understandable	 to	 societies	
(unlike	economic,	financial	and	legal	issues)	and	also	because	al-
most	all	society	members	care	about	identity	disputes.	
The	changes	that	have	taken	place	across	the	globe	over	the	past	
twenty	years	have	led	to	a	growing	demand	for	a	sense	of	secu-
rity.	One	of	 its	sources	 is	a	strong	collective	 identity	and,	above	
all,	national	(more	frequently	understood	in	ethnic	than	political	
terms)	and	religious	identity.	As	a	result,	conflicts	over	remem-
brance	tend	to	be	reborn	rather	than	extinguished	in	highly	de-
veloped	countries	(examples	of	this	include	the	fact	that	the	Span-
ish	political	left	has	resumed	its	demand	that	the	body	of	General	
Franco	be	removed	from	the	Valle	de	los	Caídos	or	attempts	to	re-
move	monuments	to	Confederacy	leaders	in	the	southern	states	of	
the	USA),	and	nothing	suggests	that	this	trend	will	be	reversed.	
This	 phenomenon	 has	 also	 affected	Ukraine,	where	 its	 effect	 is	
reinforced	on	the	one	hand	by	the	previous	weakness	of	modern	
liberalism	and	on	the	other	by	the	ongoing	war	and	the	clear	dete-
rioration	of	the	living	standards	of	most	Ukrainians.	
The	operation	of	UINP	meets	the	needs	of	the	new	situation	and	at	
the	same	time	the	new	situation	is	being	used	to	remodel	Ukrain-
ians’	 historical	 consciousness.	 Since	 it	 has	 the	 status	 of	 a	 state	
agency,	its	potential	to	influence	is	much	higher	than	that	of	other	
centres	tasked	with	similar	goals	which	have	only	social	media	at	
their	disposal.	The	institute	operates	with	great	self-confidence,	
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disregarding	public	opinion	or	possible	international	consequenc-
es.	Its	administration	clearly	does	not	care	about	the	possibility	of	
a	deterioration	of	relations	with	Poland	or	Israel,	nor	do	they	care	
much	more	about	the	possible	deterioration	of	relations	with	the	
European	Union,	especially	given	the	currently	predominant	view	
that	Ukraine	has	no	chance	of	joining	the	EU.	The	only	thing	that	
matters	to	them	is	Ukraine	and	that	Russia	is	a	deadly	enemy	and	
the	‘antithesis’	of	Ukraine.	On	the	other	hand,	leading	Ukrainian	
politicians	focused	on	current	affairs	seem	not	to	see	the	external	
costs	of	such	a	historical	policy	or	disregard	these	costs.	The	op-
eration	of	the	institute	fits	in	with	the	general	national	patriotic	
mobilisation	actively	co-created	by	the	central	government.	Thus	
UINP	has	been	given	a	free	hand	and	can	implement	its	extensive	
plan	of	modifying	Ukraine’s	collective	memory.	
Tadeusz a. Olszański
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aPPendIx
The one hundredth anniversary of the Ukrainian 
Revolution: the official celebration plan
The	plan	for	celebrating	one	hundred	years	of	the	war	for	independ-
ence	 developed	 by	 the	 Ukrainian	 Institute	 of	 National	 Remem-
brance	and	approved	by	the	Ukrainian	government85	envisages	the	
commemoration	of	the	anniversaries	of	the	following	events86.	
[1]	 The	 one	 hundredth	 anniversary	 of	 the	 outbreak	 of	 the	
Ukrainian	Revolution	and	 the	establishment	of	 the	Central	
Council	of	Ukraine,	March	2017.	
[2]	 The	one	hundredth	anniversary	of	 the	 forming	of	 the	First	
Ukra	inian	 Regiment	 named	 after	 Bohdan	 Khmelnytsky,	
May	2017.	
This	regiment,	and	after	it	a	few	others,	was	formed	as	part	
of	re-forming	of	Russian	army	units.	No	large-scale	celebra-
tions	of	this	anniversary	were	seen.	
[3]	 The	one	hundredth	anniversary	of	the	establishment	of	Sec-
retariat	General	of	the	Central	Council	of	Ukraine,	the	first	
Ukrainian	government,	June	2017.	
[4]	 The	one	hundredth	 anniversary	of	 the	proclamation	of	 the	
Ukrainian	People’s	Republic,	November	2017.
It	 may	 be	 expected	 that	 this	 will	 be	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	
proper	cycle	of	celebrations	on	the	state	level.	
[5]	 The	one	hundredth	anniversary	of	the	proclamation	of	inde-
pendence	of	the	Ukrainian	People’s	Republic,	January	2018.
This	 sequence	 of	 anniversaries	 illustrates	 the	 way	 the	
Ukrainian	 patriotic	 left	 has	 evolved	 from	 the	 demand	 for	
85	 www.memory.gov.ua/news/uryad-zatverdiv-plan-zakhodiv-z-vidznachennya-
100-richchya-podii-ukrainskoi-revolyutsii-1917–19,	accessed	on	6	March	2017.	
86	 The	left	column	contains	the	exact	wording	as	included	in	the	plan	(skipping	
the	entities	in	charge	of	holding	the	celebrations);	the	right	column	includes	
the	necessary	comments	and	also	mentions	important	events	which	have	
been	skipped	in	the	plan.	
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broad	 autonomy	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Russian	 Republic	 through	
a	federated	state	(after	the	Bolshevik	Revolution)	to	full	inde-
pendence	(after	the	Red	Guard	launched	the	attack	on	Kyiv).	
[6]	 The	one	hundredth	anniversary	of	the	Battle	of	Kruty,	Janu-
ary	2018.
The	Battle	of	Kruty	on	29	January	slowed	down	the	Bolshevik	
march	 towards	 Kyiv,	 facilitating	 Ukraine’s	 peace	 negotia-
tions	with	the	central	powers.	
[7]	 The	one	hundredth	anniversary	of	approving	the	Tryzub	
as	 the	national	emblem	of	 the	Ukrainian	People’s	Republic,	
February	2018.	
[8]	 The	 one	 hundredth	 anniversary	 of	 liberating	 Crimea	 from	
the	Bolsheviks,	April	2018.
Ukrainian	 troops,	 by	 gaining	 control	 of	 central	 and	 then	
eastern	and	southern	Ukraine,	were	operating	as	part	of	the	
much	stronger	German	troops	occupying	the	territories	sur-
rendered	to	them	by	Russia	under	the	Treaty	of	Brest-Litovsk.	
skipped:	The	overthrow	of	the	UNR	by	Hetman	Skoropadskyi	
in	April	1918	(supported	by	German	troops),	the	proclamation	
of	the	Ukrainian	State	(it	survived	until	December	1918).	
[9]	 The	one	hundredth	anniversary	of	the	establishment	of	the	
Ukrainian	Navy,	April	2018.
[10]	 The	one	hundredth	anniversary	of	the	‘November	Upsurge’,	
the	Ukrainian	uprising	in	Lviv	as	a	consequence	of	which	the	
Western	 Ukrainian	 People’s	 Republic	 was	 proclaimed,	 No-
vember	2018.	
[11]	 The	one	hundredth	anniversary	of	the	establishment	of	the	
Ukrainian	Academy	of	Sciences,	November	2018
This	was	one	of	the	last	moves	of	Hetman	Skoropadskyi.	
skipped:	The	overthrow	of	the	Hetman’s	state	and	reinstate-
ment	of	the	UNR	after	a	short	civil	war.	
[12]	 The	one	hundredth	anniversary	of	the	announcement	of	the	
Act	of	Unification	of	the	Ukrainian	People’s	Republic	and	the	
Western	Ukrainian	People’s	Republic,	January	2019.	
skipped:	The	fall	of	the	Western	Ukrainian	People’s	Repub-
lic	(July	1918),	clashes	with	Denikin	(White	Russian)	troops	
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(May-November	1918),	Petliura	taking	the	dictatorship	in	the	
UNR	(November	1918).
[13]	 The	one	hundredth	 anniversary	 of	 the	 First	Winter	March	
of	the	UNR	Army,	December	2019.
The	Winter	March	was	an	attempt	of	saving	part	of	the	forc-
es	of	 the	defeated	army	by	 sending	 it	 on	a	 raid	 in	 the	 rear	
of	 Denikin	 and	 the	 Bolshevik	 armies.	 It	 continued	 until	
May	1920	and	ended	by	uniting	with	the	assaulting	Polish-
Ukrainian	troops.	
skipped:	The	Polish-Ukrainian	agreement	of	April	1920,	the	
Polish-Ukrainian	 offensive	 followed	 by	 a	 retreat,	 the	 par-
ticipation	 of	 UNR	 troops	 in	 a	 defence	 operation	 in	August	
1920	(the	 defence	 of	 Zamość),	 the	 UNR	 continues	 to	 fight	
after	the	Polish-Soviet	truce.
[14]	 The	one	hundredth	anniversary	of	the	Second	Winter	March	
of	the	UNR	Army	and	the	one	hundredth	anniversary	of	the	
executions	of	UNR	Army	soldiers	near	Bazar	village,	Zhyto-
myr	Oblast,	November	2021.	
The	 Second	Winter	March	 (or	 Ice	March),	which	 ended	 in	
complete	 failure,	was	 an	 attempt	made	by	 a	 group	of	UNR	
soldiers	detained	in	Poland.	It	was	aimed	at	using	the	wave	
of	peasant	uprisings	to	reconstruct	the	Ukrainian	state.	Its	
participants	were	the	first	to	use	the	name	‘Ukrainian	Insur-
gent	Army’.	
It	 is	 characteristic	 that	 the	 anniversaries	 of	 these	 upris-
ings	 that	 continued	 until	 1922,	 the	 symbol	 of	which	 is	 the	
so-called	 Kholodnyi	 Yar	 Republic	 (present-day	 Cherkasy	
Oblast)	have	not	been	included	in	the	official	state	narrative.	
These	 anniversaries	will	 also	 certainly	 be	 commemorated,	
but	as	part	of	a	separate	agenda.	
